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ABSTRACT

Since the January 25, 2011 revolution, the Police reform has been an important
priority on the political agenda in Egypt. Human rights violations, as well as the
mediocre police performance presented good argument for the necessity of the
reform. However, after the June 30, 2013 political change, the demands of police
reform were less vocal, and the argument of the war on terror became a priority. This
was the interest of this thesis entitled "Prospects of Police Reform in Egypt's
Changing Political Environment" submitted by Rabha Allam and supervised by Dr.
Amr Hamzawy at the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American
University in Cairo. The thesis addressed the question of the relation between the
police reform and the changing political environment in Egypt between 2011 and
2015. And to answer this question, it introduced the experiences of four countries
which conducted police reform through changing political environments such as
Brazil, Turkey, Poland and South Africa. It also relied on 22 in-depth interviews with
police officers and human rights advocates to assess the extent of the introduced
reform and the prospects of any potential reform. The police reform was
conceptualized and operationalized through four main norms of democratic policing
which are political neutrality, de-militarization, professionalism and accountability.
Although, the Egyptian case failed on the political neutrality and the de-militarization
levels, it proved partial success on the professionalism and the accountability levels.
The thesis concluded to admit a positive relation between the police reform and the
democratic political change, and also the interdependency between the four norms of
police reform. Egypt might have missed the chance to adopt a radical reform as in
Poland or in South Africa but still can be inspired by the Brazilian and the Turkish
model.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCA: Central Agency for Auditing
COP: Community Policing
CSF: Central Security Forces
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
MB: Muslim Brotherhood
MOI: Ministry of Interior
NDP: National Democratic Party
NGO: Non-governmental organization
NSA: National Security Agency
SCAF: Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SSI: the State Security Investigations
SSR: Security Sector Reform

GLOSSARY OF POLICE TERMS

molazīm awwál: First Lieutenant
naqīb: Captain
rā'id: Major
muqadim: Lieutenant Colonel
'aqīd: Colonel
'amīd: Brigadier General
liwā': Major General
altaftīsh: Inspection
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I. Introduction
After the January 25 th 2011 revolution in Egypt, many voices have risen to demand
the reform of the police apparatus whose brutality was an essential reason for the
masses to revolt. On the other hand, the complete collapse of the ministry of interior
(MOI) after several days of attempting to suppress demonstrations has added more
significance to the reform demands. For, the MOI was unable to function
professionally under pressure for consecutive days. Right after the revolution, the
debate regarding the police reform was quite clear about its mandatory nature. But,
few months later, the reform debate has substantially faded. It has rather transformed
into strong statements about preserving security, postponing reforms and regaining the
state's prestige as well as the priority for countering terrorism.
Despite the fast changes that occurred in the Egyptian political environment in the
last four years, only one constant prevails, the human rights violations conducted by
the police1. Thus, the police reform seemed to be a seasonal priority that shows up on
the agenda when the violations rates go up. Hence, this study aims at contributing to
the Egyptian debate about the police reform from an academic perspective and to
reflect on its relation to the political change. The Egyptian literature concerning the
topic is actually very few. Thereby, this study is an attempt to add to the literature by
linking the Egyptian experience to other similar international experiences. It is also an
attempt to clarify the prospects and the conditions of the police reform in the changing
political environment in Egypt since 2011. In addition, this study aims at informing
the policy makers about the main challenges of the police reform, the favorable
conditions to overcome them, as well as the potential actors in this process. Despite
the diversity of the actors involved in the police-reform debate, their respective
impacts on the actual reforms introduced have not been the same. Certainly, the
different attempts at police reform have been affected by political context and balance
of power. Therefore, this study aims to explore the relation between the police reform
and the changing political environment to determine the favorable context to promote
the police reform agenda. It is also investigating how police reform was managed in
Egypt between 2011 and 2015. The main idea is to assess the degree to which the
1

For more details see the Human Rights Watch, "the World Report", Egypt, for the years 2012, 2013,
2014
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democratic policing norms were applied and how they possibly could be introduced
and applied in the Egyptian context.
In the following sections, the methodology of the study is explained followed by
the conceptualization and the operationalization of the police reform. Then, the related
international and local literature is extensively reviewed. Afterwards, four
international cases of police reforms are presented to specify the political context, the
major drivers and actors of the reform, as well as its substantial challenges. After that,
the Egyptian case is examined to assess the reform experience in the changing political
environment between 2011 and 2015. Then finally, the study suggests a bunch of
policy recommendations on police reform customized to the Egyptian context.

8

II. Methodology
In order to answer the previously mentioned research question, the study rests on a
variety of literature concerning police reform on the theoretical and the practical
levels. First, the theoretical literature was extremely important in determining the
analytical

framework

within

which

police

reform

is

conceptualized

and

operationalized. Police reform was extensively tackled in the international literature to
describe the defining norms and criteria of democratic policing. Four main norms
were quite important to this study, which are police political neutrality, police
demilitarization, police professionalism and police accountability.
Concerning the practical literature, four case studies were examined to determine
the relation between the police reform and the changing political context.
Accordingly, Brazil and Turkey stand as cases of gradual police reform where the
changing political context consolidated democracy on the long term. However, Poland
and South Africa give an example of radical police reform in a wider context of
political change on the short term. Then the Egyptian literature was quite informative
about the evolution of the police reform and its relation to the change in the political
environment especially in the last four years.
Beside the local literature, the study relies for the Egyptian case on 22 in-depth
interviews with 11 police officers (including three former officers) and 11 human
rights experts. The interviews, conducted in February and March 2015, were based on
the snowball non-random sampling technique. This sampling technique was chosen
due to some police officers having neither the ability nor the willingness to discuss
reforming their apparatus. Some officers were reluctant to talk to a stranger (the
researcher), others found it inappropriate to talk about police problems with a nonofficer, while others simply lacked any ideas to discuss. Moreover, it was quasiimpossible to apply a random sampling since police officer registers are inaccessible
for researchers. Moreover, the general environment of political tension and the several
terrorist attacks targeting police forces made it extremely difficult to gain the trust of
the officers. Therefore, I approached the police officers through liaisons in order to
gain their trust and consent to conduct the interviews. Although, I had several
connections to higher ranks in the police, I have not contacted them about this study
9

fearing there unwelcoming reaction. For, by the time of conducting this study the
ministry of interior was not open to criticism or objective analysis regarding its
performance in the middle of the war on terror.
As for the human rights activists, the sample included several authors who have
written some of the most important studies about security sector reform in Egypt, as
well as activists who have taken part in police-reform initiatives in the last few years.
Some of these human rights experts and activists recommended officers/former
officers for interviews. The sample included eight police officers. Their ranks are as
follows: two molazīm awwál, three naqīb, and one rā'id, muqadim and 'aqīd,
respectively. Of the three former officers, at the time of their retirements two had the
rank of naqīb and the other had the rank of 'aqīd. Thus, the sample includes two
molazem awaal, five naqīb, two 'aqīd and one rā'id and muqadim each. Only one of
the police officers agreed to meet me in person. Most of them (eight) preferred
telephone interviews while two wanted to conduct their interviews through
emails/online texting. But I met all the human rights activists and experts in person,
except for one who was living in another governorate at the time. These interviewees
were affiliated with universities, research centers, NGO institutions; two hold PhDs,
three have Master’s degrees, while the others were either activists or journalists. As
for gender representation, only two respondents were females, from the experts'
category. The interviews were conducted following the instructions of the IRB of the
American University in Cairo. The interviewees were fully informed about the
purpose and the details of the study, before giving their written consent. Almost all of
the police officers were reluctant to sign by their real names, rather preferred to write
alternative names. This was also the case of three only from the human rights
advocates' category.
The sample is extremely limited; I admit that only 11 officers/former officers
can’t determine the opinions of around 39,000 officers nationwide. Similarly, only 11
human rights advocates cannot represent the views of all human rightists in Egypt.
The snowball non-random technique might also have limitations; it cannot be
representative of the views of all officers. People belonging to the same network or
who are related to each other in any way might share the same views concerning
police reform. But for the exploratory nature of this study, such a sample can be
10

deemed satisfactory as a beginning. Nevertheless, this limitation is complemented/
triangulated by the local literature covering the evolution of the police status between
2011 and 2015. This study tries to identify the common ground in the police officers
and human rights activists' views in order to recommend a balanced policy for police
reform. Moreover, by transferring the police officers' views to the human rights
activists and vice versa, the study has a semi participatory purpose aiming to break the
ice between two groups that seem to be antagonist. Yet, their views are
complementary to design a balanced reform policy. For, incorporating the inputs of
these two groups was essential to draw realistic strategies and successfully implement
them in many countries that experienced police reform.
The research question in this regard is:
-

How is the police reform related to the changing political environment in
Egypt between 2011 and 2015?

Accordingly, few other questions are tackled as follow:
-

What is the ideal reform conforming the Egyptian case?

-

Which aspect of the four democratic policing norms is more likely to
emerge in Egypt? And why?

The study tackles two variables which are changing political environment, as
independent, and the police reform as dependent. Previously I was intending to
incorporate democratization as an independent variable, yet the changes in the
Egyptian political context between 2011 and 2015 cannot really be described as a
democratization process. First, because some argues that what happened in Egypt was
a clear revolution that is still developing until today. Hence, it does not correspond to
the gradual and peaceful nature of a democratization process. Second, political change
perfectly applies to what happened in Egypt, regardless of the orientation of this
change towards a democracy or an autocracy. It only identifies the occurrence of
certain aspects of change without specifying the direction and the description of this
change. For that same reason, political transition was not adopted as an independent
variable. Transition actually suggests a certain path towards a specific end, which was
not the case in Egypt in the last four years, since this end was not that clear nor
successfully reached. And by changing political environment I mean the change that
occurred in the laws, regulations and constitutional principles and that impacted the
11

Egyptian political life. It also applies to the change that occurred in the different state
institutions especially the executive (change of government), legislative (change of
parliament) and judiciary bodies. Along the respective changes in the political culture
of the people, that was reflected in their attitude and participation patterns. That was
also reflected when the people chose to protest the police brutality on different
occasions, then to abstain from protesting on other occasions. Then the repercussions
of each of the two choices on promoting the police reform on the political agenda. In
this regard, there are two distinct phases within the timeframe highlighted in this
study, from January 2011 to June 2013, then from June 2013 to present (April 2015).
Hence, the study tries to detect the change and continuity in the police policy when it
comes to reform taking into consideration the respective changes occurring in the
political environment.
On the other hand, the police reform corresponds to the bunch of policies that
transforms police apparatus in order to be more effective, abided by the law and the
human rights principles. More details on the analytical framework in this regard are
included in the following section.
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III. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Police Reform
In this part, police reform is examined through four norms of democratic policing
to show how each of them contributes to democracy/autocracy consolidation in a
changing political environment at large.
A- Police Neutrality
A crucial concept in democratic policing, neutrality refers to an apolitical apparatus,
which provides public safety and security for all citizens without discrimination. It
also refers to the police of the whole nation or people – not the police of a certain elite
or political regime. The principle of neutrality contradicts police practice in
authoritarian regimes, where political opponents are persecuted in order to undermine
their participation in political life. Hence, in a country transitioning to democracy, the
police should abide only by the law and not the directives of politicians or the ruling
elite (Bayley 2006).
Such a principle is of huge importance in building the legitimacy of the police,
which will as a result be perceived as serving for all. Therefore, democratic police
should not manipulate evidence or crime rates for the sake of a government’s political
status; rather, it should act lawfully without any political affiliation or discrimination
(Das 1995). Accordingly, a neutral police force equals one without any political
narrative but the law. It should not, at least theoretically, adhere to a certain political,
social, or economic narrative that values or discriminates against a specific social
group. Otherwise, the police neutrality and legitimacy could easily be shaken (Das
1995).
In this regard, a democratic police force consists of two major procedures when it
comes to neutrality: it should be independent of all political affiliation and it should
enable all political parties to practice their civil and political rights without
restrictions.
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B- De-militarization of the Police
A major criterion for democratic police is de-militarization, which corresponds to a
clear differentiation between military and police forces and their respective jobs.
According to democratic norms, the police should rely on more than just its weaponry
and armory in order to gain the public’s trust. To better serve the public, the police
should emphasize its civilian nature and be differentiated from the military. Extensive
arming of the police can be an obstacle that impedes peaceful interactions between the
police and the public it is serving. Accordingly, the police should realize that its job
does not only rely on firearms but rather many other elements as well. The police
should work with citizens to address their fears, mediate in social conflicts to prevent
them from transforming into violent incidents, and work in criminal investigations in
cooperation with prosecutors. Thus, force should be a minor aspect of police work
and only applied if other methods are proven to be incapable of solving the problem
in question (Bayley 1994, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006).
Other forms of de-militarization correspond with the rupture in military traditions
within the organization of the police. Civilian ranks and management patterns should
be emphasized rather than the old military patterns. Nevertheless, some would argue
that para-military forces within the police are necessary in specific contexts, such as
the French gendarmerie and the Italian carabinieri. In this regard, the organizational
structure of these forces should be separated from the rest of the police to preserve its
civilian nature. Accordingly, some contexts, like a terrorist threat, can mandate paramilitary police activities. But still, the more police are heavily armed, the less they
will interact closely with the public, thereby losing one of the most important tools in
countering terrorism – people's trust (Kraska & Cubellis 1997, Pino & Wiatrowski
2006). Hence, this study will focus on the separation of the police from the military
forces, and the split of the military tradition from the police as well as the role of para military forces, namely the central security forces- CSF, in Egypt’s counter-terrorism
strategy.
C- Professionalism
Democratic police should be professional and effective in performing their duties. In
this regard, police violence and brutality reflects a serious lack of professionalism,
when an officer is unable to solve cases without applying excessive force or torture.
14

Here, the problem of police brutality could easily be dealt with if officers receive
proper training and education that enables them to act without violating the law and
human rights. This perspective applies to police violence whether during
investigations, arrest, and while handling mass demonstrations (Das 1995).
Accordingly, applying physical and psychological force in criminal interrogations
does not entail professional effectiveness as it can lead to false confessions and
misleading results (Costanzo & Redleich, 2010).
Professionalism has different interpretations and procedures; it also involves
providing adequate salaries that decrease officers’ tendencies towards corruption. A
decent salary and comprehensive financial package for policemen will decrease their
inclinations towards accepting bribes or misusing their authority to generate an
unlawful income.
Professionalism also corresponds to good education, training, and suitable tools
that enable officers to perform their duties without breaking the law. Legal education
on human and civil rights will decrease policemen’s disposition to illegal behavior.
Also, practical training that predicts different situations policemen might face will
help them deal with future situations in a less violent way. Training in soft skills such
as decision making, negotiations, and conflict prevention enables policemen to better
decide when to use live ammunition and when to use language and persuasion (Stone
& Ward 2000). Extensive training in investigation methods allows policemen to build
their cases on solid evidence rather than violently-extracted confessions.
Professionalism also involves suitable patterns of management, recruitment, and
promotions based solely on merit. If policemen are recruited based on objective
criteria, they will more likely retain their training and then adhere to the force’s
internal regulations. Accordingly, merit-based promotions will help a good leader be
promoted to a suitable rank within the management hierarchy. Likewise, a
management based on objective systems of incentives means that rewards and
punishment can be used to consolidate the police doctrine based on democratic norms
and minimize wrongdoing and violations. Some writings include in the
professionalism the internal control unit which evaluates police performance and
punishes wrongdoings, while other writings consider this part as the internal aspect of
15

police accountability. Nevertheless, the internal control unit should be considered as
an integral part of police professionalism. This is simply because professional police
cannot function properly if they do not incorporate internal effective disciplinary
mechanisms, favoring good performance and punishing offences. In this regard, the
internal control unit should evaluate police performance according to two points: their
ability to lower the crime rate and their respect of human rights (Stone & Ward 2000).
Some internal control units simply investigate reported misconduct or misuse of
firearms after their occurrences; others keep track of all officers' records to identify
those who commit repeated mistakes to a point where they are seen as dangerous to
the whole apparatus and thus must be dismissed. A third type is more aggressive in
protecting the integrity of the apparatus, such as staging a bribe to randomly test an
officer's integrity or inclination towards corruption (Stone and Ward 2000).
Considering all of these measures, the democratic norms – in a democratic
policing model – precisely define professional police performance. Thus, the degree
of professionalism and institutional reform within the police is directly related to the
force’s legitimacy and public image. Legitimacy, which is "the consent of the
governed," is a founding pillar of a democratic regime, without which the police will
lose citizens’ voluntary compliance with legal orders (Pino & Wiatrowski 2006).
Some would suggest that policy guidelines should be established to better
structure police work in every way. These written guidelines must highlight both what
is allowed and what is not in order to provide a variety of alternatives for the police to
follow (Kelling 1999, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). These guidelines should emphasize
transparency in managing the police, while also serving as a basis for accountability
when investigating misconduct.
This study does not consider all of these measures. Instead, it focuses on salaries,
anti-corruption measures, promotional criteria, recruitment, training patterns, and
internal control mechanisms.
D- Accountability
"The police in democratic societies are created by that society and the police are
therefore accountable to the citizens of that society" (Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). The
16

major criterion that differentiates a democratic police from other forms of police is
civilian oversight over the police force’s work. Apart from the internal control
mechanism that holds police accountable within its own administrative chain of
command, civilian oversight counts among the external accountability mechanisms.
There are plenty of accountability mechanisms that target police work in a
democracy.
The first level of external or civilian oversight is exercised by prosecutors, who
scrutinize police work by reviewing evidence in criminal cases or launching
investigations into controversial cases (Stone & Ward 2000). Another civilian
oversight mechanism is granted to the courts or the judiciary, which have the
authority to omit evidence or confessions if proven to have been collected illegally.
The courts have another authority over police performance through civil litigation
undertaken by victims of police misconduct. These trials are extremely important in a
democratic policing model; if the judiciary is not able to hold the perpetrator of police
misconduct accountable, then the whole legitimacy of the justice system will be
shaken in the eyes of its citizens. Such an idea of judiciary failure corresponds to the
impunity of some individuals in society, unacceptable in a democratic regime in
which the rule of law should reign (Stone & Ward 2000). Parliaments in democratic
regimes also have an authority of oversight over the police. This parliamentary
oversight is exercised through budgets; it occurs when parliaments review budgets,
grant funding for a certain project, or investigate corruption issues with regards to
police spending. Moreover, parliaments have the authority to investigate a certain
policy or case that results in controversy. But in other situations, parliaments review
the police force’s plan as a whole and evaluate police performance on a yearly basis.
Above all other accountability mechanisms, parliaments have the authority to design a
new policy/bill regulating police work in order to avoid misconduct or enhance its
future performance (Stone & Ward 2000).
Between the political and the judicial accountability mechanisms comes the
ombudsman, an oversight commission, also known as an inspector general or civilian
complaint review board. An ombudsman usually receives complaints regarding police
performance or misconduct, and investigates them thoroughly by checking official
documents and, in some cases, interrogating witnesses. It might also have the
17

authority to transfer the case to a criminal court or to the head of the police force to
decide on an administrative penalty. Another important part of an ombudsman’s role
is that it has the authority to advise the police on needed training or policy guidelines
to initiate reforms that will help avoid potential misconduct in the future. Thus, it has
the ability to shape the police’s future protocol (Stone & Ward 2000).
In addition to state institutions, civil society also plays a significant role in the
accountability process. Human rights and research organizations need to be involved
in advocacy in order to foster a culture based on human rights, dismantle the impunity
system, and support victims of police misconduct both legally and culturally. These
organizations should work to promote police accountability on the political agenda of
state institutions. This role should be complemented by the media to widen the circle
of impact and forge a culture that respects human rights and does not tolerate
violations. Accordingly, civil society should be active in explaining that a strong and
effective police does not equal human rights abuses, but should rather perform its
duties with full respect for human rights and liberties (Stone & Ward 2000, Pino &
Wiatrowski 2006). Applying more of these mechanisms will translate into more
democratic police norms being emphasized. Hence, this study will investigate these
mechanisms to determine which are likely to exist in the Egyptian context and which
are not.
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IV. Literature Review
The topic of security sector reform at large and the police reform in specific is
relatively new and has not been tackled enough in Arab literature. However, the
international literature is sizeable in this record, and with multiple perspectives,
among them being reform’s relation to democratization and political change.
International debate has focused primarily on three types or models for police work –
professional policing, or the traditional way to do the job; community policing, the
American innovative way to do the job; and democratic policing, the reformed way to
do the job, with interaction with other civil authorities to protect human rights and
balance the security/freedom dilemma.
In the professional model, policing is done solely by the police apparatus, which
defines the determinants of security and implements them with no visible partnership
with the community. In community-policing, an essential partnership is built between
the police department and local community to define the sources of threats to public
security and the best strategies to encounter them. Similarly, the democratic policing
model involves a deep partnership with the community, but on a more national and
macro level. Therefore, democratic policing presents a multiplicity of oversight
mechanisms targeting police work, in which security is part of a wider plan for
respecting human rights and consolidating the democratic regime in question.
The American literature took the lead in discussing the requirements and
conditions for successful police reform, whether from the American experience itself
or due to American involvement in rebuilding Germany and Japan after WWII.
Nevertheless, the American literature primarily emphasizes the professionalism of a
strong police apparatus, enabled with all professional tools and equipment to better
protect the public safety. Therefore, American literature on police reform since the
1960s is anchored mainly in the major perspectives of management and organization.
These writings aimed to assess the ability of police departments in coping with
new societal needs and improving their respective performances. Some studies
focused on assessing the reasons for resistance to change and the best ways to
introduce acceptable and applicable changes without stimulating protests from
19

frontline officers. Lingamneni's (1979) paper, "Resistance to change in Police
organizations: the Diffusion Paradigm", tackled this issue precisely. The study
considered the main reasons for police officers and leaders to refute an innovative
policy, as well as different procedures that could facilitate improvements in police
agencies. The study emphasized the nature of the policy, the degree of its compliance
with the general culture within the police, and the nature of police leaders/officers
who could best embrace advances. Other trends focused on assessing the structural
reforms applied in different police departments and whether or not they had positive
repercussions on police performance as a whole. Maguire, Shin, Zhao, and Hassell's
paper (2003) on the "Structural change in large police agencies during the 1990"
specified seven main structural reforms associated with the community-oriented
policing (COP) and tried to track them in American police agencies in the 1990s. The
COP perspective required functional and vertical differentiation to be decreased,
along with formalization, centralization and administrative intensity. However,
occupational and spatial differentiation should be increased. Based on federal police
data, American police forces applied only some aspects of the COP's prescription,
while other aspects still faced resistance to change. Despite the importance of the
study in assessing major structural changes in American police forces, it was based
only on quantitative rather than qualitative data and thus could have gained greater
insight through the contextualization of these changes.
Other American studies have presented the new techniques that police
departments in different states have used to better investigate crimes, gain the
community's trust, and conduct intelligence-led policing under the umbrella of COP.
Bayley's paper, "Police Reform: Who done it? " (2008), presents an overview of most
of the changes and reforms applied by American police agencies as well as their
contextual implications. The study offered good insight into the practical and
theoretical motivations for each reform that has taken place within police policies in
the last few decades. Interestingly, Bayley stressed that most of these reforms were
mainly inspired or encouraged by outsiders and not those within police agencies.
Thus, he argues that police reformers are mostly ex-officers or experts from outside
police organizations who provide valuable suggestions to improve police performance
so as to better respond to society's needs. Other aspects of the American literature
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focused on the intersection between police effectiveness and the accountability
mechanisms to which they are subjected. These writings primarily argued that
increased accountability procedures lead to better performance, thus demonstrating
the positive correlation between good performance and accountability in police work.
The importance of these studies lies in how they over-turned the long-standing
argument that resisted accountability mechanisms on the grounds that they deprived
police officers of the necessary authority to enforce the law. Ferdik's paper,
"Perception is reality: A qualitative approach to understanding police officers’ views
on civil liability"(2008), assessed police perceptions of civil liability, a major
accountability. The author's assumption, built primarily on previous literature, was
that police officers view civil liability negatively. The study relied on 23 in-depth
interviews with police officers working in a southeastern American city and presented
their perceptions based on their occupational, personal, and emotional experience
regarding civil liability. The paper's major finding was that police officers do not
necessarily have negative perceptions about civil liability as such. On the contrary, the
majority of responses supported the process of civil liability since it constitutes the
basis for all civil rights protected by the constitution. However, the police officers
recommended many procedures to be implemented – in terms of training, legal
education, and technology – in order to give them suitable protection while
performing their jobs. Despite the sample’s limitation, which prevents the
generalization of the findings, the paper was insightful in presenting a police
viewpoint that favored accountability.
A similar study by Paynne and Time, "Support for Miranda among Police chiefs:
a Qualitative Examination" (2005), examined the evolution of police chiefs’ views in
terms of eliminating the Miranda rule. The Miranda rule, issued in 1966, states that
police officers must notify persons under arrest that they have the right to remain
silent, since anything they say can be used against them in the investigation 2. If a
person is not read the Miranda rule at the time of his/her arrest, the future judge has
the authority to consider any confessions unlawful, deeply damaging the case. The
study focused on determining whether the police chiefs believed that the Miranda rule
2

“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a
court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided
for you. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to
speak to me?”
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enabled or impeded police work. The data was collected via 97 survey sheets filled
out by the police chiefs in Virginia, including 75 who responded to the open-ended
questions as well. On the contrary to previous literature from the 1970s and 1980s that
presented the Miranda rule as an obstacle to law enforcement, the majority of the
responses supported the Miranda rule, and even those who demanded it to be changed
were merely requesting a more accurate formulation of the statement and not its
cancelation. Therefore, this study presented the officers' positive views about the
mechanisms that are tailored to make them more accountable while performing their
job. The authors were not interested in explaining why opinions changed about the
Miranda rule; instead, they clearly described why the officers supported it at the time.
Most of those who supported the Miranda rule cited its effectiveness in enhancing
police work, protecting civil rights, and implementing the constitution.
Apart from the American experience, a new context since the early 1990s has
introduced new understanding on police reform – or, more precisely, security-sector
reform in general. After the fall of the USSR, eastern European countries managed to
formulate negotiated transitions to democratic regimes. In these circumstances, the
major task of the new governments was to dismantle the coercive apparatuses of the
old regimes and rebuild them on new norms respecting democracy and human and
civil rights. These democratic transitions were guided with international organizations
involved in security such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Accordingly, some
western countries were more involved in the assistance efforts to guide these
transitions such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This trend
developed a new flow of financial and technical aids focusing mainly on rebuilding
the security agencies on democratic rules to be more professional, abided by the law,
and accountable to civil authorities. Hence, experts who were practically involved in
assistance programs in eastern European and Latin American countries from the early
1990s produced a large part of the related literature. They focused on the reform
processes in the respective countries – the vetting, recruitment, training, and, most
importantly, the legal framework linking the police apparatus with other public
institutions. The major aim was to build or reform security agencies to be compatible
with the emergent democratic rule.
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Therefore, a large portion of the related literature dealt with the challenges faced
by local and international reformers and foreign donors in order to present their
experiences and to guide future reforms. An example was Pino and Wiatrowski's
book, "Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries" (2006). The
book consists of two parts. The first is primarily theoretical and conceptually links
police reform and the democratization process. The second part focuses on case
studies of police reforms in Iraq, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Kazakhstan. The
main idea of the book is the interdependency between democratic policing and the
democratization process, showing that democratic policing cannot exist without an
interactive civil society and a high potential of social capital. The book
underestimates the COP strategy, suggesting that it should be used in a wider context
of human rights primacy to contribute on a deep level to building democratic policing
practices. From this perspective, the book states that American police reforms based
on the COP strategy are not enough to build democratic policing in countries that are
going through the democratization process. Rather, the reforms must be a part of a
comprehensive plan for democracy promotion based on transparency, legitimacy, rule
of law, commitment to human rights accountability, and the subordination of the civil
authority.
Another example is Bayley's book, "Changing the Guards: Developing
Democratic Policing Abroad" (2006), in which he discusses the challenges
encountered by international donors and reformers in establishing democratic policing
in conflict-torn societies. Given the disparities of the different contexts where
international assistance on building democratic policing is introduced, Bayley gives
the minimal basic criteria upon which new institutions should rely in order to be
defined as democratic policing. He argues that democratic policing should be
absolutely accountable to the civilian authority outside its command, abided by the
law, conformed to international standards of human rights, and highly responsive to
societal needs in public safety and security. Adding to this, the book discusses in
detail the major reform strategies that should be prioritized as well as other
complementary reforms that can be introduced gradually and in parallel to the main
reform process. Bayley carefully explains the interdependency between the
democratization process and the main criteria of police reform. On one hand,
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democratic policing should be accountable to the law rather than to the government,
which should preserve police neutrality vis-à-vis politicians and hence provide a
security service for everyone and not just certain groups or elites. On the other hand, a
democratic police force should primarily protect the major rights that constitute the
democratic nature of the government, such as freedom of speech, associations, and
other political and civil rights. A second trait of democratic policing is its
accountability to people outside the force, such as the parliament, judiciary, or other
civilian boards that review police performance. Such a trait emphasizes the primacy
of civilian authorities over police work in a way that should promote the authority of
the elected over unelected officials. A third trait is the necessity for professionalizing
the police apparatus in a way that enables it to better fight crime without undermining
the basic rights of the people. The professionalism equation is not isolated from the
greater context of democratization since an effective police force is indispensable in
an emergent democracy, providing security that the people need to practice their
political rights in order to enrich the democratization process. The book also offers an
important insight about the efforts of international assistance in the Security Sector
Reform- SSR to facilitate the evaluation and thus the improvement of these efforts in
the future.
A similar attempt to draw the defining criteria for democratic policing was
introduced by Ungar (2010) in his book, "Policing Democracy: Overcoming
Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America". Here, Ungar determines certain
aspects of democratic policing that should be developed in parallel to provide a
security policy based on citizens' basic rights. He highlights the importance of agency
restructuring, whether in terms of enhancing geographical decentralization or
specialization or changing the types of internal authority. A second aspect of reform
that he presents is professional support based on salaries, job security, enhanced
technology, and equipment. The third aspect is the control mechanisms that take
different forms, ranging from an internal affairs unit within the police to the national
ombudsman. He then focuses on the legal changes that should accompany all these
reforms to provide a legal basis for change, changes that involve not just the police
but also the entire criminal justice system. Finally, Ungar discusses community
policing as a method to enhance police-citizen interactions and improve the
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apparatus’ responsiveness to the people's needs. After proposing a police reform
model, the author then considers the experiences of several Latin American countries
in evaluating their accomplishments in this regard, based on field work and in-depth
interviews he conducted with local prosecutors, judges, and police officers. He
concludes with recommendations on overcoming obstacles to reform in Latin
American police forces.
Another important book – and in-line with Unger’s – is "Policing Developing
Democracies", edited by Hinton and Newburn (2009), which includes 12 case studies
about reforming police apparatuses across four different continents, in countries going
through different stages of the democratization process. In the introduction, the
editors define the major norms that should guide reforms introduced in a new
democracy: equity, delivery of service, responsiveness, distribution of power,
information, redress, and participation. On the other hand, the editors present the
special circumstances in which new democracies survive, such as weak institutional
structures, corruption, a weak rule of law, poverty, inequality, high crime rates,
societal instability, and low levels of accountability. Hence, they discuss how
different types of police reform should interact with each of these conditions in an
emergent democracy in order to create a sustainable reform process within the police
apparatus. The book is very useful in terms of looking at reform in action with regards
to political context and the possible obstacles that any change might face.
Fuentes' "Contesting the Iron Fist: the Advocacy Network and the Police Violence
in Democratic Argentina and Chile" (2005) offers a slightly different argument. By
studying the network of human rights advocates who promote police reform as well as
those who support the status quo in terms of the police's iron fist, Fuentes finds that
introduced reforms are kept at the theoretical level and face real challenges in being
implemented. Fuentes argues that the political reforms introduced in Latin American
countries since the 1980s have failed to protect citizens' civil rights that have been
desecrated by police violence. In countries where the state is implementing
socioeconomic reforms or structural institutional changes, the government tends to
introduce a strong police apparatus to manage social discontent. In this regard, the
advocacy networks managed to promote police reforms on the political agenda, but
they were less influential when it came to effecting the reforms' actual
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implementation within the police apparatus or criminal justice system. The author
incorporated other intermediary variables such as the structure of the political
opportunity, the nature of the policy actors, both those promoting and resisting the
reform, and the nature of the security problem as well as the security/liberty dilemma.
Stone and Ward (2000) introduce a more detailed vision of the accountability
mechanisms that should govern police work in an emergent democratic regime. In
their study, "Democratic Policing: a Framework for Action", they stress the
importance of multi-leveled accountability mechanisms, which they say aren’t
contradictory but rather complementary in preserving wider control over police work
in a democratic regime. They explore three different types of accountability
mechanisms: internal control, governmental control, and civil society control. Despite
the importance of all three types, the authors emphasize the special importance of
internal control in promoting professionalism and discipline within police work. They
survey reforms

promoted

through

transparency,

training,

technology,

and

organizational and cultural change. The authors also discuss the external control
mechanisms conducted by the government and the dilemma of civilian politicians
controlling the police without undermining its neutrality. The study focuses greatly on
prosecutors' authority in promoting police accountability through legal procedures,
civil litigation, and public trials. Further, the issue of parliamentary oversight is
presented through two perspectives – budget control and inquiries of police
misconduct. The third level of accountability – civil society control – involves social
control over police work through the media, civilian oversight boards that investigate
police offences, and research and human rights organizations promoting change. This
paper provides a wide overview of different procedures of accountability applied to
police work, arguing that police work will be more democratic as more of these
mechanisms are introduced.
The multi-ethnic conflicts that exploded in the 1990s have produced several
international peacekeeping missions in Africa, the Balkans, Asia, and Central
America. In this regard, the UN and other international organizations involved in
these missions shifted their security angle from inter-country peacekeeping to intracountry peacekeeping. Therefore, civilian police forces were much needed as the
military troops employed in these areas to preserve security and public safety. Many
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guidelines and manuals have been published by international participants in these
missions to highlight the context of post-conflict reconstruction, the basics of building
new institutions, and the balance between local ownership and international expertise
(USIP

Guiding

Principles

for

Stabilization

and

Reconstruction

2011 - OEDC/DAC Handbook on SSR 2007). These guidelines emphasize the interdependency of the political process and the security condition, thereby focusing on
the balanced composition of the new apparatus to guarantee its legitimacy and
representation.

The

SSR

programs

were

complemented

by

Disarmament,

Demobilization, and Reintegration -DDR as well as transitional justice programs to
ensure the new state’s monopoly over arms and to allow it to control the circle of
violence.
The most important African experiences in this regard, according to Bendix and
Stanely (2008), were in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where UN missions were deeply
involved with international donors and local stakeholders to design and implement a
holistic SSR model. In both conflict-torn countries, the military, police, intelligence
apparatus, and justice system were rebuilt upon the rule of law, civilian oversight, and
political neutrality. The DDR and SSR plans were applied in parallel with heavy
funding from the UK and the US, engaging a wide range of local stakeholders
including parliament committees and civil society organizations. Therefore, Bendix
and Stanley pose the impact of international donors as the main factor for these two
countries’ success, as opposed to other cases such as South Africa, where the SSR
process was managed through national and local actors. Therefore, South Africa is in
fact a better case to evaluate in order to get a deeper understanding about locallymanaged SSR processes in transitions, as it will be examined in details in the
international experiences part.
Despite the range of recommended policies, the literature also emphasized that
there is no perfect solution to preserve security and public safety in this context. Most
of the authors’ recipes give priority to the local context in prioritizing the needed
reforms. But the political context can be extremely manipulative, to the extent of
refuting the core of these reforms. Besides, international actors/donors involved in
these missions had a multiplicity of perspectives and motivations that influenced the
outcomes. On one hand, the whole rationale of post-conflict peacekeeping and
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reconstruction missions is to link the security issue with prospects of state building
and governance. But this logic is also closely related to countries’ chances for
development. Thereby, there are some conflicting considerations guiding the
missions' decisions regarding the stabilization angle and the reconstruction angle. In
some cases, for instance, ex-combatants were reintegrated in the new police apparatus
for reasons of political legitimacy, while the apparatus's personnel should be
downsized for professional reasons to better operate and recruit on a merit- basis only.
Additionally, the SSR programs were heavily co-funded by international development
institutions based on the fact that the number-one step in development is to securitize
or provide security in order to later introduce development programs. Several purely
developmental institutions such as the British Department for International
Development have been involved in security programs in multi-ethnic societies,
especially in Africa, since the 1990s.
Taking into consideration the different types of literature regarding police reform,
there is an additional trend that discusses the failures of the reform experiences.
These writings essentially investigate the reasons for the resilience of old police
practices that were subjected to radical structural reforms. Fetsch (2013) discussed the
failure of institutional reforms in the Mexican police over two decades, starting from
the mid-1990s. His main finding was that although the reforms were quite radical and
structural, they could not challenge the persistent culture and pattern of authority
within the Mexican state and society. Different forms of contextual, cultural, and
societal obstacles blocked the reforms from being widespread, such as corruption,
clientelism, corporatism, neo-patrimonial networks, a weakness of state institutions in
the third-world countries, the legacy of colonialism, underdeveloped social capital,
and informal "rules of the game." The same logic guided Chan (1996) when he
wondered why the Australian police persisted in its wrongdoings after almost a
decade of radical and structural reforms guided by the model of COP. The reforms
saw a reformist leadership take control, with new personnel recruited and new
organizational structures put in place, in addition to new policies and strategies being
introduced and emphasized through extensive training. Nevertheless, the police’s
performance continued to be anchored in brutality and lacked the people's trust.
Chan’s major reason for this here was resilient police culture that impeded or even
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manipulated the reforms. The police culture, as she saw it, was a combination of
political and social culture, as well as an occupational culture that emerged from the
nature of the job itself.
On the Arab level, literature about security sector reform has investigated the
relationship between authoritarian Arab regimes and police apparatuses that have
usually mixed together to form the "police state". Some of the literature discussed the
relations of nepotism and corruption as well as their impacts on the security sector's
performance. Other studies, though, firmly stressed the deep relationship between the
nature of the political regime in place and the security sector, thereby highlighting the
structural obstacles to reform. Sayigh (2007) adhered to the latter argument, pointing
to the difference between re-building the security sector in Iraq and Palestine, and the
experience of the rest of the Arab world. He also differentiated between America’s
proactive engagements in these two cases, and, on the contrary, the limited depoliticized involvement in other countries where authoritarian regimes are strong US
allies. In contrast to US policy, European nations promoted gradual reform through
the civil society's activity and oversight, rather than through deeper structural
improvements in the security apparatuses themselves. After criticizing both western
approaches, he finally recommends local ownership of the reform process through
introducing legislative, organizational, and professional reforms that gradually shift
the relationship between the political regime and the security apparatuses. However,
he does not specify the motives of the authoritarian regimes to introduce such reforms
and to undermine their own wide authorities.
Adopting the same logic, Wolff (2011) criticizes the western approaches in
dealing with the Arab region through security rapprochement with authoritarian
regimes. She argues that the supremacy of anti-terrorism and migration policies over
western-Arab relations forced western policy makers to turn a blind eye to violations
of basic human rights in the Arab region. Hence, democratization vs. stability formed
the core of the west’s approach to the region. However, the Arab revolts of 2011 have
proven that the absence of basic rights in Arab countries could not sustain security on
the long term. Thus, Wolff says, the west needs a new approach to engage with Arab
states in reforming their security apparatuses, consolidating their judiciary
independence, and deepening their governance measures, in order to create a more
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viable security alliance between both sides. Her paper is primarily critical of gaps and
contradictions in western-Arab security relations, while also precisely highlighting
several platforms and recommendations to build a new approach to security relations,
one that should comply with the norms put forward by the Arab revolts.
Accordingly, the Arab revolts introduced the SSR as a top priority in the Arab
political context and opened the way for any literature in this regard. Ashour (2014)
argues that security agencies' brutality was in fact a major cause for the Arab revolts
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Therefore, a successful SSR is an accurate
indicator for the success of the Arab revolts' goals. However, the Arab SSR faced
several challenges due to intense political polarization in the post-revolutionary
context, internal resistance within security agencies, and weak knowledge about the
SSR among political elites. Further obstacles came from limited financial resources,
weak democratic institutions, an incomplete DDR in conflict-torn countries, and
limited regional support for the SSR to take place in the Arab region. Ashour's paper
thoroughly investigates the challenges of the SSR in the Arab region, yet it gives
almost no room to discussing the possibility of the reforms taking place. An exception
is Tunisia, which remains outside the pessimist context as it sought international
assistance in this regard from the very beginning of its transition.
The Tunisian experience was actually quite similar to the Egyptian one, but for
several specific variations. The different managements of the transitional period have
given some spaces to invest in some of the SSR dimensions. However, Bouguerra
(2014) is quite critical in evaluating the Tunisian experience, arguing that
international assistance was important, but that it did not institutionalize civilian
oversight nor created police accountability. He considers the SSR’s big moment as
occurring right after the revolution – but argues that the political elite lacked the
knowledge to enforce it on a holistic approach basis. Nevertheless, ratifying
international conventions against torture, establishing a national commission to fight
torture, forming several police unions, and recruiting new police personnel (almost
one-fifth of the police force have been newly recruited) were all important steps in
breaking the old police tradition. Although over 12 countries are bilaterally
cooperating with Tunisia to support "train and equip programs," the country’s police
budget and internal management still lack transparency, which impedes any real
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assessment of the degree of progress in this regard. Therefore, Bouguerra suggests a
comprehensive approach on SSR that includes the efforts of international donors
along with the government and civil society, combining an equal interest in building
capacities and setting checks and balances over police work. He also recommends
establishing collective platforms for cooperation and information-sharing about
terrorist threats among regional neighboring countries.
On the Egyptian level, literature about security sector reform is quite limited,
focusing mainly on giving reform prescriptions to transform the police apparatus.
Ashour (2012) succeeds in contextualizing the needed reform by introducing the
meaning of the SSR and its implications, along with the history of Egypt’s police and
wrongdoing. He then analyzes the slight reforms that were applied and contrasts them
with the civic demand to apply much more comprehensive reforms. He provides
interesting analysis regarding the political context in Egypt, which was not favoring
any deep reform. The main idea is that the balance of power within the Egyptian state
after the revolution continued to preserve the status quo in terms of security. This is
closely related to civil-military relations in Egypt’s power equation in general, and to
civilian control of the armed forces and security apparatuses more specifically.
Therefore, the SSR was perceived as a dependant variable on a successful democratic
transition in the country. Ashour’s recommendations are quite tailored to the Egyptian
case and do not merely highlight general principles that apply to any case of police
reform.
Accordingly, Brumberg and Sallam (2012) stress the tight interdependency
between the current security sector and the political regime in Egypt. Adopting a
wider definition of the security sector, they include the military alongside the police
apparatus and also underline the historical background of the two institutions, thereby
concluding that any potential SSR in Egypt should rely on the will of the political
elite, especially the president, along with the mandatory consent of the military. In
this regard, the international community should support any enhancement of the
security sector’s performance to support civilian oversight and respect for human
rights.
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In his 2012 paper, "Above the State: the Officers' Republic in Egypt", Sayigh
builds upon his previous work to focus on the Egyptian case. Here, he introduces the
deep involvement of military officers in Egypt’s economy and political rule since the
1952 revolution. Different types of professional control and financial incentives were
applied to distance the military from meddling in politics, especially in Mubarak's era.
Therefore, the military was regarded as a caste of officers playing almost a single role
in political life,: preserving its essential social and economic interests. Sayigh also
discusses the hidden political role played by military retirees who hold several posts
across the entire all over the echelon of the state’s bureaucracy, which in turn deepens
the militarized nature of the state. In the same logic, the paper introduces the
competition between the different security agencies in Egypt, namely the military,
police, and intelligence, arguing that the role played by the military in ousting
Mubarak placed it above other agencies in the post-revolutionary context. Therefore,
the main aim of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during its
transitionary rule, and even after presidential elections in 2012, was to preserve a
supra-constitutional status for the military in political life in order to maintain its
social and economic interests. In this context, the drafting of the constitution and the
creation of a permanent military council were planned to consolidate the military’s
position in politics, even after the end of the SCAF's mandate. Although the paper
presents several aspects of the military’s control over economic and administrative
life in Egypt, it nearly ignores the implications of this control on national and internal
security. The police’s role is discussed briefly to show its competition with the
military in certain areas, yet the military's impact on police conduct and performance
is missing from the paper.
A more elaborated attempt to assess the competition between the military and the
police and its implications on Egypt's security was undertaken by El-Houdaiby (2014)
in his paper, "Changing Alliances and Continuous Oppression: the Rule of Egypt's
Security Sector." Here, he carefully investigates the change that occurred in the
alliances of the military, police, and ruling elite in Egypt, whether the National
Democratic Party (NDP) before the revolution or the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
afterwards. Accordingly, the paper thoroughly presents the motivations of each party
in concluding and then breaking these alliances in terms of the political context.
32

Similarly, the author highlights the repeated chances that were missed to refute the
rule of the security sector in Egypt and introduce civilian control over these
institutions. The paper's analysis underlines the growing competition between the
military and the police in Egypt, without denying the supremacy that the military has
gained after ousting Mubarak and then Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Therefore, the paper
gives great priority to discussing political interactions related to the SSR, rather than
discussing the core of the SSR itself. It also presents the internal cohesion in the
military and the police as a major factor defining each institution’s attitude in terms of
preserving their interests on different occasions.
In light of the previous literature review, specific models of police reform in
countries passing through changing political environments should be tackled. The
literature guided me to examine police reform initiatives in Brazil and Turkey as cases
of long term reform. Then, Poland and South Africa are presented as an example of
short term reform. Both types of cases have witnessed different experiences of
changing political environment which was reflected in the interplay of the reform and
the challenges that faced it. Brazil was chosen because of its previous experience of
military rule as well as its reactive reform policy of the police after each of the
security crises it faced. Turkey was also chosen for its unsettled civil military relations
and the primacy of its armed forces over the political scene on different occasions.
Nevertheless, both countries have witnessed a certain level of democratic continuity
despite the obvious role of the military on the political scene. Then, Poland was
chosen to highlight the example of a radical police reform on the short term that went
hand in hand with a wider political transformation to democracy. Yet, even in a
general context of democratization, the political change that occurred in Poland via
electoral means was reflected on the police reform with a respective change in police
laws and regulations. This was obvious when the ruling elite changed several times
since the beginning of the political transformation in 1989. As for South Africa, this
model was chosen to highlight the difficulty of implementing a radical police reform,
even if it was decided and designed by a political consensus. The South African case
reflects the complication of applying a consensual reform plan in a context of growing
crime rates. Despite the relative success in building the South African police
legitimacy, fighting crimes required alternative policy to transform the police into an
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effective and professional force. Thereby, these experiences are examined in the next
section, in order to come up with some lessons for the Egyptian case.
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V. International Experiences of Police Reform in Changing Political
Environment
This chapter will examine international experiences of police reform in
countries that have faced changing political environments in the last three decades and
have since enjoyed a relatively stable democratic process. The cases of Brazil, Poland,
Turkey, and South Africa are examined as follows:

A- Brazil
1. Context
Brazil was under authoritarian military rule from 1964-84, but in 1984 it held direct,
free elections that marked the country’s first step towards democratization.
Nevertheless, police reform was not on the political agenda until the early 1990s,
when consecutive security and public safety crises forced a discussion to take place.
These crises were directly related to increasing crime rates as well as popular protests
rejecting police violence, especially in poor neighborhoods and slums.
The police apparatus in Brazil is divided into two branches, the military and
the civil police. The military police is uniformed, organized, and equipped like the
military forces, and is in charge of patrols and arrests; the force numbers around
390,450 across all Brazilian states. The civil police is responsible for criminal
investigations and preparations for prosecutions, and numbers around 155,960
(Hinton, 2009). Most of police work is conducted by the local, state-affiliated police,
while the federal-level police is less involved in street policing and instead focuses on
national cases related to terrorism and drugs that are investigated by an FBI-like
apparatus containing around 10,000 sworn officers (Skogan, 2013 & Hinton, 2009).
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform
Police reform in Brazil over the last three decades has taken different shapes, with
several different strategies. Generally, the reform took place as a reaction to several
security crises and not introduced as a group of reform policies to accompany the
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democratic process. Additionally, the changes were induced on the local level through
a decentralized series of reform initiatives that combined the effort of the human
rights community, prosecutors, university professors, and several open-minded police
chiefs. These efforts coincided with the international donors' will to reduce police
violence and enhance law enforcement techniques to support the Brazilian process of
development.
3. Reform Initiatives
Inside the favelas (slums), police presence was almost impossible, unless
through heavily-armed officers who usually raided the favelas for searches or arrests,
causing many causalities among the inhabitants. In 2000, a new initiative was
launched to establish police groupings in special areas (GAPE) in order to securitize
one of the biggest slums in Rio. The GAPE force was unarmed, instead employing the
Community Policing- CoP strategy to reduce the use of force and build trust within
the population. The initiative was successful in establishing permanent police patrols
in the slum, reducing rates of violence, boosting gun control, minimizing drug gangs’
control over the favela, and empowering the population to move freely at any time. In
2002, the GAPE initiative was extended to three other slums in Rio, upon the request
of their inhabitants; however, this initiative was highly dependent on the personal
skills of its commander and funds provided by NGOs to introduce the slum’s youth to
alternatives to crime (Da Silva & Cano, 2008).
Some reform initiatives targeting improvements in police professionalism
were the result of partnerships between police departments on the local level and
public universities to develop nontraditional curricula in human rights and
criminology for police officers. This project aimed to loosen the traditional military
culture of the police, build trust and networks between officers and academic elites,
and enhance officers’ professionalism by channeling new skills and knowledge in
action. This project was also extremely dependent on donors' funds as well as the
personality of the military police commander (Leeds, 2007).
Similar initiatives were introduced through partnerships between civil
society/the human rights community and police departments to hold dialogue over
human rights in action. These panels enabled police officers to express themselves
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and think beyond the human rights curricula they had studied, fostering a wider
perception of their meanings. The panels also helped build alliances among antagonist
stakeholders and transcending stereotypes. One of these initiatives began as an
advocacy campaign to report police misconduct in the early 1990s and ended up
becoming the most important NGO in police training and arms control, Viva Rio.
(Leeds, 2007)
There was also a federal program conducted through the justice ministry – the
National Program for Public Security and Citizenship (PRONASCI) – to enhance the
local police’s capabilities and improve their work conditions. This program aimed to
boost managerial and professional skills through comprehensive training and better
equipment, as well as improve work conditions for low-level police officers. It also
evaluated its own results through national surveys that analyzed changes in
perceptions of police officers and the population. An example of this was a research
on the impact of the program on officers' inclination towards the use of force in their
daily work, which yielded the important finding that highly-educated and well-trained
officers were less likely to use force. The same inclination was true for officers who
were more experienced, compared to their lesser experienced colleagues. Likewise,
the majority of those who had a positive perception about community policing were
those who had received good training in different managerial and professional
subjects. The same portion of surveyed officers coincided with high rates of job
satisfaction (Skogan, 2013). Thus, we can conclude that a good training program to
enhance police professionalism leads to higher rates of job satisfaction and a lesser
inclination towards using force in a police force’s daily contact with citizens.
Unlike the professionalism initiatives that were received positively by the
police, the accountability mechanisms had greater difficulty in being established in
Brazil. The first ombudsman was first established locally in five different states in the
mid-1990s, and is now present in almost half of Brazilian states (13 out of 27 states).
The ombudsman can come from the human rights community or be a former
prosecutor. Their purpose is to receive complaints from citizens about police abuses
or from low-ranking officers about their departments. In both cases, however, they
have limited investigative authority, given the lack of clear, official police records. A
further problem is that they are tightly linked to the states’ public safety secretariats,
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which questions their independence. Similarly, they are appointed by governors,
meaning their jobs can easily become politicized. (Leeds, 2007)
4. Challenges
Despite these initiatives, police performance remains under the expected level and
faces many challenges that impeded the reform process. The main challenge in this
regard is the discontinuity of successful initiatives due to a lack of funds, a change of
leadership, and low degrees of institutionalization. Additionally, there is a lack of
awareness about human rights and the need for police abuses to be criminalized. In
fact, public culture has played a negative role, since it perceives police violence as an
effective factor for reducing crimes. On the other hand, the oversight mechanism,
namely the ombudsman, has no substantial authority to suggest a comprehensive plan
for police reform and oversight. Thus, political opportunities following significant
crises could allow new initiatives to be born, but they can hardly survive afterwards,
since they are highly dependent upon the political context.

B -Turkey
1. Context
Since the establishment of the modern Turkish state in 1923, the military has gained
special status, enabling it to influence the political scene on several occasions, such as
in 1960, 1971, 1980, and, much later, in 1997. Therefore, the military has successfully
challenged civilian authority within the political regime by utilizing geopolitical
arguments related to Middle Eastern instability and the Kurdish threat to Turkey’s
national security. The Turkish police are functionally divided into two major divisions
– the Turkish National Police (TNP), which is in charge of policing, conducting
patrols, and investigations in urban areas, and the Jandarma, a more military-like
force deployed for policing rural areas. While the TNP is a professional agency
affiliated to the interior ministry, the Jandarma is formed of young soldiers serving
their military duty (15 months) under the authority of the defense ministry
(Goldsmith, 2009). The TNP consists of 193,000 personnel that receive two years of
police training, while the Jandarma consists of 300,000 conscripts who receive only
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six weeks of intensive military training. Despite the distinct differences in
composition and training, these two divisions of Turkish police almost fulfill the same
job, with their respective authorities separated by vague boundaries. In some areas
where rural migration has invaded urban centers, both police agencies are present,
while in other cases, both of them might be absent, thus creating a security vacuum.
Adding to this is that each division’s internal regulations are not subject to open
access, removing their work from public review.
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform
Turkey has enjoyed a democratic tradition since 1945. However, the country is not
considered a consolidated democracy due to the frequent military interventions on its
political scene. Hence, the case of police reform has always faced difficulties in
becoming a priority in such a securitized political milieu in which the military
contests civilian authority. Nevertheless, Turkey’s ambition to join the European
Union has created momentum for police reform, serving as a veritable driver for a
series of initiatives reorienting police work in Turkey (Goldsmith, 2009).
3. Reform Initiatives
Reform in Turkey is taking the shape of dispersed initiatives in different dimensions
of police work, and is primarily motivated by the EU accession plan. The EU is
funding a project tailored and managed by the United Nations Development Project
(UNDP) to enhance civilian control over police agencies by improving the
administrative skills of the civilian authority (governors) in their respective relations
with the TNP, Jandarma, and interior ministry. The core of this project is extremely
problematic, since the whole regime has a deep problem in managing civil/military
relations; however, it is approaching this subject through building capacities and
training cadres in order to deepen the accountability of the police to the civilian
authority (Goldsmith, 2009).
Other projects of reform are dedicated to improving the police agencies' capacities
in investigations to better fight organized crime, money laundering, and narcoticrelated activities. This trend of enhancing the police's professionalism is part of a
larger trend in the Turkish government since 2005 to minimize losses resulting from
crimes by employing a preemptive approach. The latter method involves providing
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the police with new technology and sophisticated equipment to build and analyze
huge databases of potential criminals and crimes' mapping. The project aims to
prevent potential crimes and threats from occurring by adopting a communitypolicing project intertwined with a new model of technology-supported information
systems. Such an approach cannot be implemented without an active model of
intelligence-oriented policing that acquires data through surveillance cameras in
public areas as well as screens citizens’ personal information to enrich the POL-NET
database. Along with this project, a new crime-analysis center and public-order
project were established to better prevent crimes (Berksoy, 2013). Nevertheless, these
projects have been criticized for their preemptive nature and for dealing with specific
citizens as potential criminals, namely the Kurds, political opposition groups, and
trade unions. Moreover, officials’ access to a wide database of personal information
has been deemed a threat to individual privacy.
Despite the advancement of the professionalism projects, steps towards greater
accountability have faced much resistance. In 2001, the constitutional court in Turkey
issued a ruling about an amendment to the criminal code that enables policemen to
use firearms on a terrorist suspect if he does not comply with calls to surrender or
shows an intention to use weapons. The court's ruling canceled the amendment of the
law that was introduced earlier in 1996 for being unconstitutional, as it jeopardizes the
lives of suspects without sufficient reason, especially as it is not conditioned by
suspects actually using arms against police officers, but rather only the intention to
use them. Hence, the cancelation of this amendment was considered a gain for human
rights and an upholding of article 17 of the constitution, which emphasizes a citizen’s
right to life. Nevertheless, the criminal law was again amended in 2006, but this time
it practically reversed the court's ruling by granting police officers wide authority to
use firearms if a suspect does not show compliance with a call to surrender, without
even mentioning the use of weapons. Since the court’s objection focused on the
intention to use weapons and whether their use would actually threaten an officer's
life, the new formulation of the law omitted the weapons' issue altogether, and
considered a lack of compliance to the call of surrender as a good reason for an officer
to use firearms (Berksoy, 2013). The case resulted in legislators and the government
showing solidarity with the police, defying the concerns of the constitutional courts
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regarding human rights. In other cases, however, legislators were aligned with the
judiciary against the wide authority of the police; still, though, the police was able to
impose its will at the last minute. Generally, police investigators were given authority
to define the nature of the crime they were investigating, before transferring it to the
courts. Hence, the police oriented the work of the judiciary by defining the crime and
preparing the indictment. But in 2005, a new law of criminal procedures was drafted
to narrow the police authority in this regard and prevent it from defining the crime
beforehand. Additionally, the draft of the law established a new unit of judicial police
under the authority of the justice ministry to deploy the police’s investigative
apparatus under the supervision of prosecutors. Nevertheless, the amendment of the
law was introduced without the judicial police unit due to fierce rejection by the
interior ministry (Berksoy, 2013). Such a case reflected the power the police have
against any attempt by another institution (outsiders) to impose reform, even if they
are legislators and the judiciary. Moreover, the police continue to use its previous
authority in defining crimes without minor compliance with the new law (Berksoy,
2013).
But EU pressure to establish accountability mechanisms to watch over police work
was partly satisfied by the establishment in 2012 of two new institutions to oversee
the police. The first, the Turkey Human Rights Institution, was created to work as an
ombudsman that receives and investigates citizens' complaints of police misconduct
before they are directed to the courts. However, the composition and funding of this
institution has raised some doubts about its independence, since 10 out of its 11
members were appointed by different governmental agencies. An EU report on the
institution questioned its independence and recommended amending its laws so that
its members are elected by another state institution, unaffiliated with the executive
(Berksoy, 2013). The second accountability initiative was an internal control unit
within the interior ministry named "The Police Oversight Commission." This
commission is in charge of investigating alleged violations of human rights
committed by police officers, annually evaluating police work, and recommending
new reforms to the MOI to improve police performance (Berksoy, 2013). Despite the
positive influence that these two institutions might bring to police accountability in
Turkey, their work seems to be constrained. Specifically, there is an active
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administrative law preventing any legal investigation of a governmental official,
including police officers, without the consent of his/her direct manager. Therefore, if
the police leadership wants to maintain the impunity of police officers, they can easily
challenge the authority of these new institutions.
4. Challenges
The main challenge to police reform in Turkey is obviously the wide authority that the
military has on political life, considering the overlap between military and police
functions. Some reform initiatives envisaging the downsizing of the Jandarma and the
enhancement of its police training would directly affect the status of the Turkish
Armed Forces, which is not easily tolerated. Therefore, no substantial reform can take
place without the consent of the military. Besides, police control and oversight is not
likely to happen if there is no real political will. But the Turkish government widely
benefits from the huge authority granted to the police in its fight against the political
opposition, especially leftists and trade unions. Thereby, the police work is politicized
as long as it tends to criminalize political and social protests. Nevertheless, the EU's
accession plan still plays a helpful role in pushing for police reform, as does the
positive experience gained by the TNP and the Jandarma while serving in UN
missions worldwide (Goldsmith, 2009).

C- Poland
1. Context
In 1989, Poland witnessed a negotiated political transition that allowed free
parliamentary elections to be held and a new government to be formed. The new
government was jointly formed by the figures of the solidarity movement (the main
opposition movement, born from a workers union coalition) and the old communist
regime. Therefore, the democratization process has directly resulted in a major
transformation plan for state institutions, especially the security sector. The new
leaders of the country were aware of the importance of reforming the security
apparatus as a precondition for the whole regime's transformation. Nevertheless, some
writings mark 1980 as the beginning of the democratization process, when the
solidarity movement, then a workers union, conducted a major strike that forced the
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communist government to lower the prices of goods after an earlier increase. A short
window of political openness was quickly ended with the imposition of martial law in
late 1981. Hence, some analysts refer to this short democratization process of two
years to explain the success of the negotiated transition in late 1989, based on sharing
parts of the government with the opposition and old regime figures (Paun, 2007).
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform
The main driver of the reform was the transformation from a communist country to a
democratic one; so, police reform was just a part of the wider reform plans. There was
also a deep desire to break with the old practices of the communist police, which
spied on society and controlled all political activity. Moreover, several prominent
human rights figures were appointed to the top of the new police apparatus, to design
the transformation plan and make sure it was properly implemented. Among the new
designers of the security policy were also prominent police figures who were engaged
in building police unions following the transition. But the most decisive driver was
the funds and pressures that western European countries and the United States
invested to accelerate the reform plan. They also participated in training new officers
to respect human rights and democratic rules. Added to this was Poland’s ambition to
join NATO and the EU, a goal that was decisive in introducing several waves of
reform within the security sector as a whole. Thus, Poland successfully joined NATO
in 1999 and the EU in 2004 (Paun, 2007).
3. Reform Initiatives
The reform of Poland’s police was part of an extended reform aiming to place security
forces under the oversight of civil elected authorities according to democratic rule.
Therefore, the first step was to depoliticize police work by issuing a law in 1990 that
prevented police members from involvement in politics or following political parties
(Æwiek-Karpowicz & Kaczyñski, 2006). Nevertheless, Polish police officers are
allowed to be active in professional police unions which negotiate with the
government for better wages and work conditions (Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000).
Police reform in Poland occurred in several waves and was, interestingly, linked to
the political affiliation of the ruling coalition. In 1990 and again in 1999, when
solidarity was in power, reforms tended to decentralize the police service, bringing it
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under the control of the civilian authority of provincial governors. But when the
socialists governed in 1995 and 2002, reforms tended to centralize control over the
police (Paun, 2007). The decentralization/centralization of the police had direct
impacts on police organization, professionalism, and the accountability mechanisms
that controlled their work.
In 1990, Poland abandoned its old communist militia and created a new police
force, with new uniforms and commanders. A new post of national police commander
was created at the top of the police hierarchy, to be appointed by the interior minister
upon the approval of an advisory committee comprised of politically diverse members
from the higher and lower houses of parliament. Thus, the national police commander
was responsible to parliament, in addition to his professional responsibility vis-à-vis
the interior minister. Right after the local elections of 1990, new local police forces
were created to fulfill the police patrolling locally while investigative authority
remained in the hands of the national police. The local police were supposed to be
funded by the local budget, but due to a lack of funds, the police localities were
dependent on the central authority. However, the lack of funds encouraged a serious
wave of corruption within the local police authority, to the extent of institutionalizing
the channels of bribes to coincide with the hierarchy of the organization (Paun, 2007).
Such a deficiency affected the local police’s effectiveness and helped back the postcommunists’ argument to recentralize the police structure when they gained power in
1993.
The 1995 reform abandoned the local police forces and brought them once again
under central police authority, while also widening the prerogatives of police in using
firearms. Nevertheless, when the different parties of the solidarity coalition were
reunited in 1996, they won the elections and formed a government with an ambitious
plan of decentralization. The new plan was implemented on the police in 1999, when
new local police were created in each of the 16 provinces. The new local forces of the
counties were subjected to a double mechanism of oversight by the local mayors and
the provincial police chief to whom they were affiliated. Therefore, the local police
were politically responsible to the local executive body and professionally responsible
to the higher national police chief. Additionally, the local police chiefs had to present
an annual report to the local legislative councils about their activities, deficiencies,
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and challenges (Paun, 2007). Financially, the local police suffered from low
resources, until 1999 when a new law required the national government to channel
80% of the police budget to the localities and preserve only 20% for the national
police departments (Oliver & Klenowski & Dimambro, 2006). The last reform,
introduced in 2002, returned the right to choose local police chiefs to the hands of the
higher police hierarchy, rather than local mayors and governors, after only unbinding
consultation with the local executive and legislative bodies. Such a reform was
recommended by several foreign security advisers, as well as being dictated by high
levels of corruption and crime (Paun, 2007).
Alongside the organizational and professional reforms, the new Polish police was
subject to multiple accountability mechanisms. Among them was the firm
differentiation between police work at large and the work of the secret police service,
called the Security Bureau (SB), which was dissolved and replaced with a new entity,
the State Protection office, which was strictly prohibited from spying on society. SB
personnel, numbering around 25,000, were downsized to only 6,000 after verification
to determine whether they should remain in office or be released (Grajewski, 2004).
All leaders above 55-years-old were promptly released from office, while the younger
generations were tested to make sure they were suitable for the new job. Almost 75%
of the verified SB officers rejoined their work, whether with the office of State
Protection or with the police in general. Similarly, the result of the verification
process on ordinary police officers caused the release of almost 50% of commissioned
officers and 30% of warrant police officers (Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000). To
compensate for these vacancies, new police officers were recruited and intensively
trained by the US, UK, and Germany between 1990-95 on the basics of police work in
a democracy (Paun, 2007- Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000). Other analysts suggest that
almost 50% of Polish police officers were dismissed, with the newly recruited and
trained officers numbering around 50,000 in 1995 (Oliver & Klenowski & Dimambro,
2006).
Another aspect of reform was the lustration of politicians and public figures to
determine who was collaborating with the SB in spying on society. This reform didn’t
directly target the police apparatus, but was a wider initiative to politically condemn
the old practices. The collaboration matter was extremely sensitive, but the lower
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house of parliament issued a decision in 1992 that forced the interior ministry to
release all the names of parliamentarians, officials, attorneys, and other public figures
who were rendering secret services to the SB. After some resistance, the ministry
revealed these names to parliament, yet the resulting debate did not lead to criminalize
collaborators. The argument to avoid such criminalization was that a big part of the
SB’s collaboration documents was destroyed from 1989-90. Hence, the revealed
names were just a small portion of the collaborators; while some names were
protected, others would be punished if lustration was strictly applied. Later on, in
1995, a top politician was accused of collaboration with the Russians; this file was
reopened, but this time, it was legally encountered. The parliament issued a new law
in 1997 requiring governmental figures to present a report confirming or refuting their
previous collaborations with the SB. This report was reviewed by the spokesman of
the public interest to decide if they were eligible to stay in office or not. The lustration
law did not criminalize actual collaboration with the SB, but rather only sent those
who lied about their past to a lustration court (Grajewski, 2004). These procedures
were definitely important in sharply breaking with the old practices of spying on
society for the interest of the political regime. Despite the new State Protection office
inheriting most of the old SB personnel, new practices were applied to oversee the
office’s work. However, in 1993, the British MI5 revealed the Polish State Protection
office’s illegal involvement in the arming of Irish terrorist groups. Therefore, the
Polish parliament created a permanent parliamentary committee in 1995 to oversee
the secret operations conducted by the special services affiliated to the State
Protection office (Grajewski, 2004).
Additionally, the new police law introduced directly after the transition made it
possible to sue police officers who committed human rights violations. Accordingly,
low-ranked officers were exempted from punishment if they were ordered by their
seniors to commit unlawful practices, while the senior officers who ordered these
practices could be convicted with a five-year jail sentence. Police officers could also
be subject to judicial trials for corruption or harming national interests, and police
officers who violently dealt with prisoners in custody could be punished with a three
to five year sentence, or even more if the violence led to death (NDI, 2008).
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This law empowered the work of the ombudsman that was formed in 1987, before
the transition, and made it possible to better investigate human rights abuses and sue
the perpetrators. The ombudsman was in charge of receiving and investigating
complaints of human rights violations on both the local and national level. Yet its
main procurement was the dissemination of human rights culture and the belief that
every public official is accountable for his/her actions.
4. Challenges
The transformation of the Polish militia to a professional police force faced several
challenges, but the most important obstacle was replacing the large number of
dismissed experienced officers with inexperienced young recruits. Despite the
intensive training they received in western countries, the newly-recruited officers’
lack of effectiveness held back police performance as a whole. In addition, the
transformation time was an occasion for high rates of crimes, which conflicted with
people's expectation of seeing professional police officers taking control.
Additionally, the need to decentralize the police, in order to democratize it and render
it more accountable to the people contradicted with the inability of the localities to
fund their police budgets, which allowed corruption to escalate. Before 1999, local
police forces were allowed to receive donations from different entities, which opened
the door for organized crime organizations to pay for their immunity, despite
conducting illegal activity. The police was also widely understaffed, since a large
number of officers preferred to work in private security companies or joined
international missions abroad. This tendency was primarily caused by the low salaries
of police personnel, compared to the other opportunities in the security field
elsewhere. At large, the polish experience mainly proved that good police reform
should rest on the will of a strong, democratic, ruling political coalition. (Oliver &
Klenowski & Dimambro, 2006)

D- South Africa
1. Context
South Africa suffered long decades of apartheid, when the police was the regime's
tool to oppress the population. Therefore, the milestone of the democratic process in
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the post-apartheid era was a police reform plan that was collectively formulated by
different political actors. Between the 1940s and early 1990s, South African police
was administratively divided to serve 11 conglomerations called "homelands," where
white police officers comprised around 90% of the forces and black officers made up
only 10%. Additionally, black officers were given authority over their black
conglomerations only, and did not enjoy full police membership. Black officers were
not allowed to give orders to white officers, and they were never promoted to higher
ranks. Moreover, police work in the black conglomerations consisted merely of
preserving the public order and countering insurgency, while the real police work in
terms of fighting crime was applied only in the white conglomerations. Thus, the
major goal of the reform was to include more black officers within the post-apartheid
police apparatus, to make it more representative and trusted by the population (Pruitt,
2010).
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform
In the South African experience, there was a strong belief that successful
democratization should involve a respective radical change in the police. Thus,
following apartheid, a negotiated transition allowed the drafting of a new doctrine for
the police to change its conceptions, organization, and tactics. The main goal in
reforming the police was to replace its bad image of partners in crime and oppression,
with the new image of being protectors of the totality of the people, without
discrimination. Hence, the priority for the first strategic paper introduced by the new
police in 1994 was to build the legitimacy of the new apparatus by enlarging its
representation of the population and through community policing on the local level.
Nevertheless, the strategy of building legitimacy was not successful enough in
countering the growing level of crime, which urged the government in 1998 to switch
its focus from legitimacy to fighting crime by applying tougher methods (Shaw,
2002). This shift of focus was quite significant, especially as it enjoyed a high level of
public support and opened large debates about different aspects of democratic
policing, other than building legitimacy (Altbeker, 2009). The new president built the
government’s legitimacy in 1998 on a crime fighting plan that was adopted by the
police to correct its previous deficiencies. Accordingly, the police received financial
and capacity-building assistance from different local donors. Among them business
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groups that were interested in protecting their respective interests as well as a group of
local vigilantes that was mostly active in black and poorer neighborhoods. Police
unions were also active in promoting police professionalism and overcoming
inequalities among officers (Pruitt, 2010).
3. Reform Initiatives
Between 1990 and 1994, the police introduced two main reforms to help purify its
image, before negotiations decided on a police new doctrine. The first reform was to
create a separate, internal stability division to preserve public order from potential
tensions produced by the enemies of the negotiations. This attempt aimed at saving
the efforts and time of the station-level police to help build their capacities in fighting
crimes. The second reform targeted the Security Branch (SB), which was in charge of
internal intelligence, and placed it under the authority of the investigations division.
Both reforms were orchestrated by police managers who expected the enemy of the
past- the opposition- to come and rule over them, and so these reforms were intended
to appease general protests against the police (Shaw, 2002).
In 1994, negotiations about police reform arrived at many recommendations that
were later issued as the green paper of the ministry of safety and security. The new
police doctrine prioritized the establishment of new legitimacy for the police, to gain
the people’s trust after so many years of being the enforcer of apartheid. The doctrine
also allowed the police to decide on the reform’s implementation plan. This was
effected because no members of the African National Congress (the main opposition
movement accessing power in 1994 elections) were in police cadres or had the
necessary expertise to carry out the reforms. Therefore, they preferred to design the
general features of the reform and give the police leadership the authority to
implement them on their own. Hence, the option of dismissing a large number of
police officers and replacing them with new recruits was never put on the negotiation
table. The doctrine also allowed old police personnel to preserve their jobs, out of the
fear that they would protest if dismissed, and requested those who had committed
major violations to ask for amnesty in return for the truth about what had taken place.
The officers involved in violations were asked to testify in details about the past in
return for forgiveness and the continuity of their careers. Thus, the Truth and
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Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a means to avoid accountability, and served as
a vehicle for old personnel to be reappointed in return for their publicized break with
the past (Altbeker, 2009). Accordingly, the new South African Police Service (SAPS)
preserved the same leadership as the old South African Police (SAP). This decision
resulted in the problem of there being no new blood injected into the police
leadership. Yet, this leadership was obviously lacking the required skills to implement
such reforms (Shaw, 2002).
Another important outcome was the decision to centralize police authority in order
to impose the new reforms equally on all police stations, in all provinces; otherwise, a
decentralized police could easily be dragged into local political conflicts. Moreover,
the police's uniforms, ranking, and organization were changed to signal a clear break
from the past. The police demographically changed, since the black constables who
served in the black conglomerations/townships were promoted and included as full
members of the SAPS. This actually increased the representativeness of the police,
but also hampered its effectiveness, since these new officers received only six-weeks
of training and were widely illiterate. On the other hand, generous retirement
packages were offered to decrease white personnel. But this policy caused many
problems, since the leaders/managers were usually the most experienced, while the
recently recruited or promoted were not. Such a problem was also exacerbated when
black officers were rapidly promoted in the SAPS hierarchy for the mere necessity of
creating equilibrium between the white and black components of the leadership
(Pruitt, 2010). Hence, problems of antagonism in the work place and double standards
in promotion policies affected police performance. Additionally, some argued that the
less competent, newly-recruited black officers were responsible for the ineffectiveness
of the post-apartheid police apparatus (Altbeker, 2009).
In an important organizational step, the police decided in 1996 to dismantle the
503 specialized investigations units and place their personnel in local police stations.
This decision aimed to enhance the investigational skills at the station level in order to
help police forces solve crimes in different provinces without turning to the national
authority (Shaw, 2002). As a result, local police commissioners had higher authority
over detectives, which sparked a kind of decentralization of authority, thus increasing
police accountability. However, some argued that this decision fragmented police’s
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investigation capacities and harmed the independence that detectives should have visà-vis police commissioners on the local level (Altbeker, 2009).
Another attempt to enhance the investigative capacities of the police was the
establishment of a new investigation apparatus called the Scorpions, which was
placed under the authority of the justice ministry. The new apparatus, announced by
the president in 1999, recruited the most skilled detectives and succeeded in building
a good reputation of solving cases in a short period. It generally applied a
combination of skills involving policing, prosecution, and intelligence to counter
crimes (Shaw, 2002). Some analysts argued that the new investigation apparatus
created a kind of duplication within the justice system, especially as it was not
affiliated with the ministry of safety and security, which they said created a new
source of police confusion. Nevertheless, other analysts saw it as a means of fruitful
competition that would motivate the police, especially in terms of enhancing the
investigation units’ capacity to fight crime.
In all cases, this competition led the police to apply tougher methods in countering
and tracking crimes. These methods consisted primarily of more military-like
crackdown operations in towns and areas with the highest crime rates. The
crackdowns relied heavily on armed forces applying road blocking, search operations,
and cordons. These kinds of operations had, by definition, proven short-term success
in arresting criminals and clearing criminal focal areas. However, a long-term process
was still needed to enhance station-level police capacities to fight crime, and not just
force its movement from one area to another according to the location of the police
operations (Show, 2002). Additionally, these operations widely contradicted the
community policing philosophy that should guide station-level police in building
bridges of trust and understanding with the local population (Altbeker, 2009).
In parallel with these professional procedures to enhance police capacities, other
accountability measures were applied to help monitor the police’s respect of the new
doctrine. At the top of these procedures was the appointment of a civilian as safety
and security minister directly after the end of apartheid. This new minister arrived
with a group of civilians, mostly lawyers and academics, to assist him in formulating
policy and monitoring its implementation. The group was later institutionalized in
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1996 as a civilian secretariat whose rank on the national level was equal to the head o f
the SAPS. These secretariats, established on both national and provincial levels, were
largely in charge of monitoring the respect of police standards and promoting their
accountability to civilian authority. However, such a civilian leadership created a
duality within the ministry, particularly angering the head of the SAPS and creating
conflict between the ministry’s civilian and police leadership (Shaw, 2002)
Moreover, the SAPS embraced the community policing philosophy on the
provincial level to gain the community's trust and address its needs closely. Such a
philosophy was implemented through appointing a special officer in each police
department nationwide to organize community policing forums (CPF). These CPFs
were formed by unelected community representatives who met regularly to talk with
the police about the community’s needs and security-related issues (Shaw, 2002).
However, the CPF encountered two main problems. First, the officers were not
culturally open to execute what the community requested, which hampered the
credibility of these channels. Second, the CPFs had minor impact on day-to-day
policing since the officers were accountable to their seniors in the central police
hierarchy and not to provincial communities or local authorities (Altbeker, 2009).
Interestingly, police unions were active in reporting police officers' wrongdoings.
These unions were unofficially formed in 1989 by reformist police officers, and were
then increased after apartheid. They focused on complaining about poor work
conditions, the slow transformation of the SAPS, and the lack of equality in terms of
work opportunities. They were also particularly active in shedding light on several
cases of police brutality, especially those conducted against blacks and which
exemplified the continuity of racism (Shaw, 2002). The unions also embraced the
community-policing approach in supporting the new legitimacy of the SAPS and
enhancing its professionalism (Pruitt, 2010).
Among other reforms that were considered to enhance the degree of police
accountability was the application of new rules for the use of firearms. Previously
during the apartheid, officers were granted the right to shoot to disperse unlawful
gatherings, without even issuing warnings. It was also legal to shoot to kill a fleeing
suspect if there was no other way to arrest him, a prerogative that was largely misused

52

by police officers. Thus, the new law prohibited the use of firearms unless there was a
real threat to the officer or any other citizen's life (Pruitt, 2010).
In line with these new regulations, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)
was established in 1995 under the authority of the safety and security ministry to
investigate any police abuse or brutality. The ICD was formed of civilian personnel,
with several braches on the national and provincial level. It has since investigated the
thousands of cases of death in police custody and police brutality cases that occur
each year (Shaw, 2002). Despite the ICD’s authority to issue recommendations to th e
relevant police commissioner, it is not empowered to make the police act upon them
(Burger & Adonis 2008). Nevertheless, the ICD's mission of holding the police
accountable to civilian authorities and constitutional norms has been relatively
successful. It also gives regular citizens the ability to access relevant information held
by the police (Pruitt, 2010).
Beside these accountability measures, the courts played an important role in
correcting police deviations by refusing to adopt any evidence obtained by cruel
methods. Such a procedure eventually helped change police culture about brutality
being an effective method to solve cases (Pruitt, 2010). On the other hand, the
adoption of crackdown operations to combat crime in the short run resulted in prisons
being overcrowded with suspects waiting to be tried. In this regard, the government
was obliged to implement a collective commutation, releasing around 24,000
prisoners with shorter sentences to allow room for newly-convicted prisoners
(Altbeker, 2009).
4. Challenges
Generally, South Africa’s police reform was centralized and highly developed in
rhetoric that referred to international literature of COP and problem-oriented policing
(POP), but was less articulate in terms of implementation. The centrality of the police
limited the reforms to superficial changes and the continuity of old police leaders
prevented the reforms from penetrating to the core of the service. The truth and
reconciliation commission was a good driver for change in terms of police culture and
philosophy, but it weakened the accountability mechanisms and reinserted human
rights violators into the police apparatus. This fact increased the probability of the
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violations' reoccurrence on a smaller scale. The community policing applied in each
of the nine provinces were found to be deficient since the central organization of the
service left little room for innovation and oversight on the local level (Altbeker,
2009). Moreover, there was an inclination towards old police techniques involving
brutality and disrespect for human rights in order to achieve high crime-fighting
statistics (Pruitt, 2010). Some of these cases were investigated by the ICD, which
worked every year on around 5,000 cases, while others were left unchecked due to the
ICD’s limited resources. Additionally, the fact that the ICD reported to the minister of
safety and security, who was also in charge of the police service, made it almost
impossible for the minister to tackle any of the police abuse cases (Burger & Adonis
2008).
In general, police reform in South Africa was collectively planned with great
political consensus. However, the implementation of the plan was widely unbalanced,
with legitimacy building given more weight than crime fighting. Therefore, when the
new reforms were later introduced to correct the initial plan, the new police's
legitimacy had already been affected by inefficiency. Also, the different stockholders
participating in the reform plan distracted its priority list, making it a good idea on
paper, but with little tangible results on the ground (Shaw, 2002). Finally, it is
important to highlight that given the economic difficulties and the inefficiency of the
whole justice system, the task of crime reduction was not the responsibility of the
police alone. The crime reduction strategy should incorporate alternative economic
chances and a parallel reform of the justice system to ensure that those in prison have
access to quick and fair trials. Meanwhile, police violence is still considered as a
factor of crime reduction. Still accountability mechanisms are playing on the opposite
side to reverse this conviction and consolidate the respect of the constitutional norms.
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VI- Assessing the Prospects of Police Reform in Egypt
In this chapter, the Egyptian context of potential police reform is introduced in
order to clarify the political environment which determines its design and
implementation. Generally, the approach of democratic policing entails many norms
and criteria. Only four of these norms are discussed here, however, to examine the
extent to which they are absent/ present in the Egyptian context and what challenges
they face in terms of being accomplished. The four norms of interest to this chapter
are the political neutrality of the police, the de-militarization of its structures and
tactics, the professionalism of its methods, and the accountability of its personnel to
civilian oversight. These norms will be thoroughly examined to specify the different
conditions defining their potential occurrence and their evolution in the Egyptian
context. But first, a historical overview of the Egyptian police is introduced to reflect
its general evolution in the light of the four democratic policing norms.
A-Historical Overview
Historians have registered an exceptional stance of a police chief under the authority
of Ramses III during Pharaonic times. This police chief refused to oppress a strike
since he was convinced that the workers have the right to request their withheld
salaries. Rather than ending the strike with force, the chief endorsed their demands in
front of the Pharaoh until they received their salaries (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.42).
However, such an attitude reflecting the true nature of a politically neutral police is
almost exceptional in Egyptian history. The Egyptian police are known in modern
history as a direct tool to repress the people for the interest of the political regime.
This has been clear during significant moments of popular mobilization against the
political authority. For instance, during the 1919 revolution, the police was heavily
applied to prosecute and intimidate political militants, especially those affiliated with
the Wafd Party. The police was also systematically deployed to forcibly disperse any
demonstration conducted by peasants to protest the high rents imposed by feudal
families on their rented lands (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.52).
In this context, the political bureau was officially established in 1922 to prosecute
Egyptians resisting British occupation, and it was later applied against all types of
political activism (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.53). In this regard, the police was complicit
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in the political and economic alliances of the rulers. But on January 25, 1952, an
exceptional incident happened in Ismailia, when the Egyptian police director refused
to surrender and turn over his men's weapons to a British force. The police force
chose to fight, and died defending Egyptian sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Ismailia
police force’s stance had been agreed upon by the interior minister at the time, Fouad
Serageldine, the emblematic nationalist figure of the Wafd Party. As a former officer
explained:
The most obvious patriotic and honorable deed done by the Egyptian police was in
this incident, yet it was not out of their own initiative, they were following the order
of the interior minister, who was a civilian at the time (Telephone interview with a
former officer, February 2015)

Accordingly, after the July 1952 revolution, the police doctrine slightly changed to
agree with the new regime’s alignment with the lower classes, especially peasants and
workers. This shift nearly ended police brutality against these classes, and a new type
of relationship was initiated with citizens, based on the principles of dignity and
respect. Nevertheless, the political militants opposing the regime of Gamal AbdelNasser continued to face political prosecution, arbitrary detention, and torture in
custody. Despite the official abolition of the political bureau in 1952, it was shortly
replaced with the General Investigations Department, which along with the military
police was in charge of politically based prosecutions. Both apparatuses were
involved in the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, the prominent opposition
movement to the Nasser regime (T. Aclimandos, 2012, p.2). In the last years of
Nasser's rule, the military was less involved in political affairs, letting the State
Security Investigations (ISS), created in 1968, take the lead in this regard (B.
Abdelaziz, 2013, p.55). Under Nasser’s rule, police violence targeted only political
opponents within police headquarters, and was not generalized against the whole
population. One exception occurred on February 21, 1968, when police used firearms
to disperse students protesting the lack of accountability of military leaders after
Egypt’s 1967 defeat to Israel. Several causalities were registered (B. Abdelaziz, 2013,
p.57). From this incident came the need to create the Central Security Forces (CSF) in
1969 to control mass demonstrations. The CSF began with only 189 officers and
around 11,690 soldiers, and increased in number until it contained around 300,000 in
Mubarak's era (O. Ashour, 2012, p. 7). Accordingly, during the rule of Anwar Sadat
and then Mubarak, the SSI became the most prominent police department, influencing
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appointments in public offices, intimidating political opponents, orienting media
outlets, and forging election results. The SSI was largely involved in electoral fraud
for the interest of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) on different
occasions.
Concerning the demilitarization, police structures were quite distinct from those of
the military in ancient Egypt. The army had the well-defined task of defending the
country while the police was in charge of preserving internal security and order within
society. The police structures were even diversified to focus on certain segments such
as the Nile River, temples, and public order within cities. Therefore, the police was
directly under the authority of the minister, who was the second highest authority after
the Pharaoh himself (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.40). However, during the different periods
of occupation to which Egypt was subjected, the idea of a civilian police completely
changed. Starting from the Ptolemaic era, the police was widely mixed with the
military corps, which has entirely changed the police's function. As a military force,
soldiers were trained to resist the country's enemies or enforce the rule of an
occupying authority. The police force was trained to protect citizens from crime and
widespread insecurities as well as preserve the public order (B. Abdelaziz 2013, p. 43
& 46). Hence, when the police's role was joined with military personnel and their
respective tactics, the civilian nature of the police was altered.
Such a policy prevailed during the different phases of occupation that Egypt
witnessed. However, the establishment of the police force in modern Egypt reflected a
gradual orientation of distinguishing the police from the military corps. When
Mohamed Ali founded a modern police force, it was mainly comprised of military
soldiers who followed the command of a specific high ranking officer assigned for
internal security. Later in the era of Khedive Ismail, the police force became more
independent from military personnel, but it still relied on military officers who
received some legal knowledge before working as police officers (M. Youssef, 2014).
The first school to train police officers in Egypt was established in 1896 and was
led by a British officer. The school enrolled youth at early age, with priority for those
who finished high school. In 1914, the school began only enrolling high school
graduates for two years, and law school graduates for one year. In 1946, the length
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was expanded from two to four years, and in 1953, it began issuing graduates with a
law degree in addition to a policing degree (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp. 34-35). Such an
evolution addressed the need to provide police graduates with legal knowledge and
other soft tools, rather than just the weapons they carried. Although Nasser himself
was appointed interior minister right after the 1952 revolution, and was followed by
other ministers with a military background, the police chain of command and its
personnel were clearly distinct from the military. Then, in 1975, a police academy
was created to include the police college, for bachelor degree in law and policing, the
high education college for master's and doctorate's degrees and the college of training
and development for post-graduate training diplomas (Babawi, 2005).
B-Political Neutrality
Political neutrality means the existence of a professional police force which is able to
serve the whole population equally, without specific preference or animosity towards
any component of society. This neutrality should especially apply to the relationship
between the police and the political and economic elites. Therefore, police work
should reflect the rule of law, without exception.
Ashour (2012) compares the SSI to the brains protecting the regime, while the CSF
was the muscles forcibly executed this protection. The SSI included several
departments in charge of close surveillance for political, religious, and student
activism, as well as syndicates, churches, and NGO activities. As one former officer
explained:
the SSI agency under Mubarak was no longer doing its essential role in
protecting the country. It kept shifting its role until it became responsible for
all the mess that happened in Egypt… the officers were doing their job and
working for long hours more than expected … but some bad people among
them, including the head of the agency, were positioning the agency to do
other missions than really protecting the country. (Telephone interview with
a former police officer, February 2015)

This pattern of unification between the police and the political regime has deeply
damaged the norm of police neutrality in Egypt. The police are no longer protecting
citizens but rather endorsing the regime's viability. Therefore, the minor attempt of
any officer to reinitiate political neutrality by refusing to be involved in the electoral
fraud (in the interest of the NDP) was violently repressed. Moreover, the police
academy recruited from a certain social level that would eventually be aligned with
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the political regime. Candidates with any political or religious affiliations are
systematically excluded, specifically those related to the Muslim Brotherhood and
graduates of Al-Azhar University, while Coptic Christians currently represent no
more than 2% of the accepted candidates to the police academy (T. Aclimandos,
2012, p.8).
The politicization of police work transcended the SSI and the CSF to other
police departments, since the whole police apparatus was applied to serve the political
status of the regime. Unlike during Nasser's era, police brutality now affected
ordinary citizens who had no connection to politics. In addition to the CSF's constant
deployment to forcibly disperse workers' strikes, the police could also apply violence
and torture against someone as a favor for another fortunate citizen who held some
kind of authority. Accordingly, police brutality was applied to simply urge someone
to withdraw a complaint he had previously filed against an officer (B. Abdelaziz,
2013, p.74, p88). An emblematic case of this was Khaled Said, who was beaten to
death by sub-officers in June 2010, an event that served as the necessary spark to
build wide consensus against police brutality. Khaled Said was completely apolitical,
yet he was not spared from police violence. Such an incident crystallized public
opinion against police practices, reflected in reactive violence that targeted police
symbols and personnel. Police officers and soldiers were verbally and physically
attacked on the streets, and more than 95 police stations and around 4,000 police
vehicles were burned during the first few days of the 2011 revolution (O. Ashour,
2012, p.9).
The constant politicization of the police led officers to use violence for political
reasons, and then to use general violence to settle their conflicts with ordinary people,
until finally they were themselves the target of the people's violence and protests
against the political regime. However, police neutrality is not completely politics-free,
meaning that democratic policing cannot be implemented without a solid political
will. Therefore, when the interior ministry's leaders were replaced during the rule of
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), there was no political will to
introduce deep changes into the equation of a politicized police force. The police
remained the tool of the political regime to weaken its political opposition, regardless
of who was actually in power (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, p.11). This applies to the SCAF
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between February 2011 and June 2012, and then as well to the presidency of Morsi,
until he was removed from power in June 2013. As one human rights expert
explained:
Lots of opportunities were lost. We had an opportunity right after the revolution; we
had another one during the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes in 2011; and a third one
right after the Port Said massacre in February 2012, and then right after Morsi's
election in mid 2012. But all these opportunities were wasted; those who were in
power were keen to support the Ministry of interior- MOI and not reform it. For three
years, we had no real political will to reform the police, yet the political opportunity
to push for reforms was very real and could have made a difference. Today [after
July 3rd, 2013] , it is very hard to impose reform on the police. (Personal interview
with a human rights expert, March 2015)
The events of Portsaid’s stadium constituted another opportunity. Therefore, I blame
the Muslim brotherhood for wasting this chance because they were in the parliament
by then. They were capable of doing anything to reform. The MOI was weak after
this failure, the street was protesting for a week in front of the MOI’s headquarters.
In these circumstances, the discontent with the MOI was wider than the political elite
circle because the event was touching a bigger part of the society. (Personal interview
with a security studies researcher, February 2015)

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) majority in parliament held back on
police reform initiatives and passed only a few amendments to raise police salaries
right before the parliament dissolution. In return, some MB supporters were accepted
at the police academy, while some anti-MB officers at the National Security agency
were excluded (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, pp. 18-19). However, we cannot say that
Morsi's politicization of the police resulted in greater control over its ranks. During
the protests in front of the presidential palace Ittihādiya in December 2012, following
the issuance of a constitutional declaration by the president that immunized his
decisions from potential appeals, the police refused to suppress the masses. Hence, the
MB's leaders were obliged to bring their own youth to disperse the sit-in, which
resulted in violence known as the Ittihādiya clashes. Nevertheless when the MOI's
headquarters were approached by protestors a month earlier on Mohamed Mahmoud
Street, police forces used excessive violence to defend the building. Such an attitude
reflected that the Police were motivated to defend their own headquarters but they
were not willing to repress the masses to consolidate the President's power. This
tendency was the main reason for Morsi to appoint a new interior minister, with
Mohamed Ibrahim replacing Ahmed Gamal El-Din (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, pp. 24-25).
Later on, the police refused again to align with the President's will on the eve of June
30, 2013 protests, but this time the refusal emerged from mid- and low-ranking
officers. As a former officer explains:
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there were clear orders from the minister to launch an arrest campaign against the
media and the youth leaders supporting the anti-Morsi Tamarrod (Rebel) movement,
but the reformist mid- and low-ranking officers refused to execute these orders,
defying the minister and the president and preferring instead to align with the masses.
(Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the political and military elites had no
interest in de-politicizing the police, thinking that they would eventually use the
apparatus when needed to diminish any future opposition. From their side, police
officers did not unconditionally align themselves with the ruling political elite; rather,
they were in continuous negotiations to extract more benefits for their own interests.
Nevertheless, they were not able to restrain from taking part in the political conflict,
since they were aware that the January 25 th revolution was more or less against them,
and hence they were personally motivated to oppose it. Some police officers were
individually inclined to avoid meddling in politics again, in order to secure their status
in the long run. But on the other hand, when interior minister Habib Al-Adly and his
deputies were dismissed and brought to justice in 2011, police officers refused to
work to protest the humiliation and detainment of their leaders (Brumberg & Sallam,
2012, p 7). In addition, although the police stayed neutral vis-à-vis the June 30 rallies
in 2013, they were motivated to suppress the pro-Morsi protestors few days later.
Such an attitude reflected the police's political preference in removing Morsi rather
than a consistent neutral stance towards political demonstrations in general. Thus, this
continuing police politicization could not be resolved without a certain level of
politics or political will to force a re-orientation of the police, from a coercive
apparatus to a politically neutral law-enforcement body (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012, p
13). Such a process is closely related to the status of a country's democratization and
the balance of power among different political actors (Sedra & Burt, 2011, p.3).
C- De-militarization
One of the main principles of democratic policing is the civilian nature of the police.
The police should not rely on its capabilities as a force but as a civilian service. The
police structure and command should be ultimately distinct from those of the military.
Accordingly, police techniques and working methods should be civilized in order to
serve the people and not fight them. Moreover, the militarization of the police is a
point of weakness for its legitimacy in the eyes of the local community and stands as
an impediment to gain the people's trust (Friesendorf & Krempel, 2011)
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Egypt has known an early distinction between the military and the police forces.
Nevertheless, the police force was forged on the military model in many aspects. The
officers' rankings, uniforms, military salutes, firearms, fighting training, and the
military life, especially in the police school, all came from the army. The militarized
nature of the police was further deepened by the creation of the Central Security
Forces (CSF) in the late 1960s. According to ministerial decree number 31, issued by
the defense minister in 1981, the MOI is considered a military entity through which
military conscripts can serve their duty (M. Mahfouz, 2011, p. 118). Such a decree
contradicts the police's nature as specified in consecutive constitutions as a "statutory
civil body" (Egyptian Constitution, 2014, art. 206). Therefore, the CSF included
thousands of young Egyptian males who served their military duty under the authority
of the interior ministry. Generally, these conscripts had not received any basic
education and were mainly trained to obey the orders of their superiors (Brumberg &
Sallam, 2012, pp.8-9). However, the CSF is not the only paramilitary force within the
MOI that receives military conscripts. As a former officer who served in these forces
explained, the paramilitary forces in the MOI are divided into three main forces:
The first one is called the services forces. These serve as guards in front of banks,
post offices and the traffic regulation authority. They are soldiers of the second
degree; I mean they are not the best degree. They follow the authority of the security
directorates, so these are the Security Forces (SF) which are organized locally. The
second force type is the Central Security Forces (CSF) which are divided into the
anti-riot forces and the fighting groups. The anti-riot forces are deployed in soccer
matches, protests, sit-ins, and so on, and are organized into divisions. Each contains
almost 110 soldiers, which are also divided into three divisions, with 33 soldiers
each, plus two to four officers and two to four sub-officers, as well as soldiers as
guards for the chiefs of the division. These are equipped with only tear gas bombs
and some cartridge rifles; they do not carry any firearms, except the personal guns of
the officers and the guns of the chief's guards. The last type of forces is the best in
terms of weapons, equipment, and the quality of the soldiers. They are called the
fighting groups, or the support groups, and are the ones who actually fight in
dangerous situations. They serve in arrests of dangerous criminals, and in antinarcotic, counter-terrorism, and state security missions. They are organized into five
soldiers, with only one officer. They have other type of weapons, rifles or automatic
weapons, and now they are all wearing masks and dressed all in black. (Telephone
interview with a former officer, February 2015)

The total numbers of these forces grew extensively from 189 officers and 11,690
soldiers in 1968, to around 300,000 officers and soldiers by the end of Mubarak's rule
(O. Ashour, 2012, p.7). Hence, these forces are the flagrant symbol of a militarized
police, due to their paramilitary-like structure and the military conscripts that they
enroll. However such a mixture with the military was never the same on the
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leadership level. Accordingly, military leaders and commanders were always spared
by the regime from police work, especially in Mubarak's rule, fearing the possibility
of coups if they were too involved in the internal affairs. Therefore, the Egyptian
people looked up to the military as a protector while considering the police, with all
its brutality and misconduct, as threat. Such a perception was extremely obvious on
the eve of January 29, 2011, when police forces were chased from streets, while the
military forces were widely welcomed and saluted by protestors (El-Houdaiby, 2013,
p.8 & p.4).
Another problem with Egypt's militarized police is that its effectiveness widely
depends on the crackdown operations led by paramilitary forces. This matter was
entrenched in police tradition during Mubarak's rule and then continued after his
ouster. Starting from the early 1980s, the crackdown operations on specific areas such
as villages, neighborhoods, or other conglomerations became more and more
frequent. They were widely initiated for different reasons, most of them political
rather than criminal. Generally, paramilitary forces impose a closure over a targeted
area, with tight searches of homes and, in some cases, burning houses, electricity cuts,
and transportation deprivations (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp. 65-66). These types of
operations continued after the revolution, but were widely accompanied by military
forces for different reasons. First, the police was endorsed by the military as a way to
renew its legitimacy following the withdrawal of the police from the streets on the eve
of January 29, 2011. Second, the military was perceived as being better equipped and
trained to enforce the law in the short term. Hence, several crackdown operations
have been initiated jointly by military and police forces since 2011 to break up
criminal or terrorist strongholds, especially in Sinai. The same case applied to
Kerdasa, in Giza, where clashes between the police and armed groups led to the
burning of the police station and the killing of police forces right after the Nahda and
Rabi'a dispersals in August 2013. Shortly after the clashes, the town of Kerdasa was
subjected to collective punishment by military and police forces, rather than precise
criminal investigations to specify the real perpetrators of the violence. Such a heavyhanded and broad response eventually served as an impetus to increase terrorist
attacks against state forces, rather than stabilizing the country or enforcing the law
(Moheyeldeen, 2014, pp. 6-9).
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The tight cooperation between the military and the police in these crackdown
operations does not reflect, however, smooth interactions between the two
institutions. Under Mubarak's rule, the MOI gained more importance in internal and
political affairs, when the military was generally distanced from the political scene.
Therefore, the MOI was a close partner to the NDP and the ruling elite surrounding
the president's son, Gamal Mubarak, who was planning to inherent his office. In this
context, the MOI's authority was widened to defy the military's in some aspects. For
instance, the State Security Investigations (SSI) enlarged its surveillance activity to
include military officers (El-Houdaiby, 2013, p.10). As an ex-officer stated:
Under Habib El-Adly's rule, the officer of state security in Ismailia, for instance,
might have greater authority than the commander of the second field army.

(Telephone Interview with an ex-officer, February 2015)

Therefore, the MOI was a sort of a defying power to the military, relying on the
close relationship between El-Adly and Gamal Mubarak's circle. The military was
motivated to take part in ousting Mubarak in 2011 to stop the inheritance project of
Gamal and the ascending ambitions of the MOI. Afterwards, when the police needed
support to redress its authority, the military was present to endorse police work for
several months. The military police and other units supported police officers and CSF
soldiers on different occasions. This support reflected a new type of relation between
the two institutions, in which the military was superior to the police. Hence, the
military was keen to assure its supremacy over the police, rather than emphasizing
civilian supremacy over police work. However, this new relationship engendered two
types of reactions among police officers. The first was a feeling of disappointment
about their new inferior status to the military, which initiated many incidents of
conflict on low-ranking levels between officers of the two institutions. An example
occurred in November 2012, when several military officers surrounded a police
station in east Cairo to protest the arrest of a military officer by a police officer at a
checkpoint. Another incident occurred in October 2014 at a checkpoint on the
Portsaid highway, when military police arrested all the police personnel who were
present to punish them for mistreating a military officer who passed by the
checkpoint. These incidents were usually settled through mediations, after the
intervention of the leaders of the two institutions; yet, no punishment for the conflicts'
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initiators was announced (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 13-11-2014). As a police officer
explained:
I believe the military has an upper hand over the police and the whole country. They
have a veto authority, and if a police officer is mistaken, he must be punished for
what he has done. (Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015)

The second reaction was a sense of excessive identification with the military,
which deepened the militarized nature of the police and made it require more weapons
and armories. This was reflected in the self image of police officers and how they
constantly compared themselves to military officers in terms of work conditions and
career path. As one officer explained:
We suffer from career stagnation. It takes us so long to be promoted from one rank to
another. I wish we applied the same rules as the military or the intelligence. I wish
we were equal to the military in everything. (Telephone interview with an officer,
February 2015)

Another officer went even further:
I do not mind at all to be punished by jail if I commit a mistake, but I want to be tried
in front of police courts and then imprisoned in special prisons for police officers, as
with the military judiciary and military prisons. (Telephone interview with an officer,
February 2015)

There was an attempt to initiate special police courts in order to prosecute military
conscripts serving their duty under the authority of the MOI, but Egypt's current
president, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, refuted this suggestion by issuing a law in October
2014 that assigned the military judiciary the right to try military conscripts from the
MOI (Al-Badil, 9-10-2014). However, there was no confirmation about the inclusion
of sub-officers in the decree, since they were previously exempted from military
trials, thanks to a decree issued by the SCAF in April 2012 (Al-Youm Al-Sabae', 304-2012).
Another problem with the police's militarization is that it negatively impacts the
effectiveness of law enforcement. A military officer is supposed to follow the orders
of his superiors; in a military battle, the only law is the superiors' orders which are
communicated to the soldiers. However,

police personnel must follow the law in

order to preserve security and public order. Thus, when the police are militarized,
officers ignore the law and instead turn to their superiors for orders. Such an attitude
requires an extensive chain of coordination between police officers and their leaders
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in each incident, which impedes and decelerates police performance. As one former
officer describes it:
When you face a situation, you do not think how to implement the law, but you turn
to your superior for instructions, who then turns to his superiors, and so on. So some
situations would generate a series of phone calls ascending the hierarchy of the police
in order to decide what to do. (M.H. Abulezz, 2014, p. 91)

From its side, the military wanted to see the police take responsibility of internal
security without really applying deep reforms. As previously mentioned, the
amendments to the police law that were passed by parliament in June 2012, right
before its dissolution, spared police sub-officers from

military courts. Hence, the

police became more civilianized; yet, all other suggestions to audit the police and
make it more accountable were ignored and marginalized. This was the result of
mutual cooperation between the Islamist parliamentarian majority, namely the
Muslim Brotherhood, and the SCAF, which was held the authority of the president at
the time (El-Houdaiby, 2013, pp. 10-16). Despite several new appointments of
consecutive interior ministers, the substance of the militarized police did not changed,
nor did the apparatus' security policy as a whole. Indeed, the SCAF's primary goal
during its rule from February 2011 to June 2012 was the restoration of security and
not its reformation (El-Houdaiby, 2013, p.25). The same can also be said about
Morsi's rule from June 2012 to July 2013, which emphasized the supply of new
weapons rather than the introduction of a new doctrine and norms. Hence, the same
militarized nature of the police prevailed and was more intensified after the ouster of
Morsi and the dispersal of his supporters' sit-ins at Rabi'a and Nahda squares. The
changed political environment following these incidents and the ascending militant
attacks on the police and military served to justify and emphasize the militarization of
the police. In this regard, the war on terrorism was jointly launched by the military
and the police, especially in Sinai, with little room for boundaries to be defined and
tasks to be specified.
Moreover, after consecutive terrorist attacks, especially in Sinai, President El-Sisi
issued a presidential decree in October 2014 assigning the military with some of the
internal security tasks of the police for two years, especially in guarding vital
institutions. Despite the several appeals against the decree for mixing the tasks of the
military and the police, which are distinct by virtue of the constitution (Al-Shorouk,
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10-3-2015), the decree stands, further deepening the problem of a militarized police in
Egypt.

D- Professionalism
There are several aspects in which a democratic police force should be professional,
in order to be effective and responsive to the people's needs. For example, a
professional police force should receive suitable education and training to enable its
personnel to solve cases without breaking the law or violating the basic rights of
citizens. Also needed are the necessary tools of investigation and data analysis, which
should be available to endorse the police's technical work in solving crimes.
Meanwhile, the police's organizational culture should comply with official/written
instructions and bylaws; otherwise, officers' performance will be impeded, with their
motivations negatively affected. The motivational dimension of police work is very
important, especially when considering work conditions, salaries, the force's
organizational structure, and promotion criteria. Therefore, if suitably designed, these
points can prevent inclinations towards corruption or police abuse. Additionally, a
professional police should be supported with a network of police unions to promote
the ethical code of the police officers, provide them with a positive organizational
culture, and negotiate improvements in their work conditions.
Most of the organizational structures and bylaws regulating the MOI were
established right after the 1952 revolution. New police laws were consequently issued
in 1955 and 1964, followed by the law of 1971, which has prevailed until today with
few amendments. Additionally, most of the modernized systems within the MOI were
introduced under the rule of Habib El-Adly (1997-2011). As a former officer stressed:
On the contrary to all that was said about Habib El-Adly, he was the first minister to
apply new methods and set new regulations for everything in the interior ministry.
The people might hate him, but he was fair to us. He put rules and regulations for
everything to make the job more institutionalized (. . .) He was an innovator. For
instance, the simplest thing, the uniforms of the police forces, especially for lowranking soldiers, their uniform was a shame, and he set new rules to circulate new
uniforms for the forces every year. (Telephone Interview with a former officer,
February 2015)

The MOI has widely shifted its interest from criminal security to purely political
security, given the fact that El-Adly arrived primarily to fight terrorism after militants
67

massacred tourists in Luxor in 1997. The MOI consists of three major branches:
public security, investigations, and central security. Public security consists of police
stations and police patrols on the streets, while investigations are divided into several
sub-departments, such as investigations for criminal acts, public funds, tax evasion
and drugs. In addition to the division for State Security Investigations (SSI) which in
2011 was turned into the National Security Agency (NSA). The third branch is the
central security sector, which manages the paramilitary forces of the MOI and is
divided into anti-riot forces and fighting groups/special operation forces, as specified
earlier. But due to the ascending politicization of the police in Egypt, the SSI, which
was essentially a part of the investigations division, gained a decisive role and
dominated other branches of the MOI, even including a paramilitary division to fight
terrorism (personal interview with a former officer, February 2015). Apart from these
major branches, the MOI is divided geographically into security directorates, and by
specialization into social, economic, criminal, and political investigations3. Hence,
there are two ways to evaluate police work, whether in terms of specialization or
geography, but from each perspective, the channels of coordination and information
sharing are quite unclear. Although the public security division does most of the
police work and employs around two-thirds of police officers, it receives the fewest
resources, equipment, and training (telephone interview with a former officer,
February 2015).
In addition to its role in ensuring the people's safety, the MOI is in charge of
preserving public order and morality, protecting people's lives and property, and
fighting crime and apprehending criminals (Said & Bakr, 2011, p.7). Moreover, the
2014 constitution underlined the police's role in the respect of human rights and
fundamental freedoms (Article 206). However, the MOI does more than those tasks
prescribed by consecutive constitutions and laws. It is in charge of issuing security
approval for almost every kind of activity in the country, which is a hidden way to
control who does what. Some specified authorities are in charge of organizing
religious pilgrimages, as well as civil defense, civil records and passport issuance (O.
Ashour, 2012, p.15). Therefore, the MOI's work infiltrates almost all types of activity

3

For a detailed structural map of the interior ministry, visit the website: http://www.interior
ministry.gov.eg/Arabic/Organization+Chart/
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on Egyptian soil, whether or not it is directly related to security affairs. As one former
officer explained:
In theory, the police's role should be to protect and serve the people, or more
specifically, to do what cannot be done by others. I mean they have to protect the
safety and security of the public, especially in terms of criminality. They should
enable citizens to be safe to practice their ordinary daily lives and daily business.
Their main job is to make sure that everyone abides by the laws legislated by
parliament. But I think today the police are doing lots of things that are beyond their
job description. They are burdened by other tasks that should not be their
responsibility, which takes away their energy. For instance, civil registrations,
passport authority, traffic and driving and vehicles' licenses, tax evasion authority…
etc. (Telephone interview with a former police officer, February 2015)

Another officer added:
The police are not doing their main task of protecting the people's lives and
properties; rather they are doing things that should be assigned to other authorities.
(Personal interview with an officer, February 2015)

In order to fulfill these multiple tasks, the MOI employs almost 1.5 million people,
equal to around 20% of the state's bureaucracy, divided into officers, sub-officers,
conscripts, constables, and civilian personnel (Brumberg & Sallam 2012, p.6 / O.
Ashour 2012, p.6). Around 830,000 of these positions are full-time jobs, while the rest
consist of part-time, unofficial informants and collaborators. Hence, most of the
growing budget of the MOI is invested to pay the salaries of this huge amount of
personnel. According to official statistics, the interior ministry's budget amounts to
almost LE23 billion, where LE19 billion is directed solely for salaries (Hashem
2014). Other unofficial estimations suggest that the actual budget of the MOI could
amount to approximately to LE85 billion (O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). Yet, the difference
between the two numbers could come from the unofficial economic activity that the
MOI undertakes. Such economic activity is probably managed by the high-ranking
colonels in the minister's closed circle, and is used to fund the loyalty payments for
the high ranks of the MOI. The disparity in salaries' between the higher and lower
ranking personnel of the MOI creates a deep feeling of alienation among officers, and
opens the door for corrupt practices that will be explained later in this section.
Police candidates study three types of courses at the police academy. The first
input comes from law school courses, public law, importantly. The second input is
related to policing, which is divided into two sub-groups, theoretical courses and
practical courses. The first subgroup is related to crime scene investigations, forensic
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evidence, psychology, and human rights. Under the second subgroup, candidates are
taught practical courses focusing on physical fitness, such as swimming, shooting,
horse riding, boxing, climbing, martial arts, and self defense (interview with a former
officer, February 2015). As one freshly graduated officer explained, not all studied
courses are really useful in one's daily work:
I do not know why we were studying all the law school curricula, they were not
useful except for the sharia law and the criminal law, as I think, but all the other
courses are not related to our job. (Email interview with an officer, March 2015)

Other officers said they studied theoretical work techniques that were
inapplicable in real work upon graduation.
We learned some useful courses, like for instance crime scene investigation. They
taught us how we should enter the scene with our hands in our pocket to make sure
we do not touch anything until the criminal lab guys are there collecting evidences
and taking fingerprints. But in reality, when I graduated and worked in
investigations, we had no criminal lab at all. So, even the limited stuff that was useful
and might be used was wasted by the limited resources and the sad reality that you
face after graduation. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)
The resources are extremely limited. The equipment of the criminal lab is only
present in Cairo and Alexandria, and they cannot serve in all cases, because this
would take time and delay the transfer of the case to the prosecutors. (Telephone
interview with an officer, February 2015)
The equipment is available but not working. I mean there is a special officer assigned
to criminal evidence, but here is the problem. If I am an investigation officer in a
police station, I receive daily around 20 reports of theft - some are cars and
apartments, others are forced theft, and so on. Generally, the criminal lab is not
working, except for the big cases, like a murder of a celebrity, but a regular theft of
an apartment, they do not even ask for the criminal lab to come and see the crime
scene… it does not matter, just arrest the maid and the building guards and beat them
until they confess. Or just think about the nephew or the son: if they are taking drugs,
they might want to steal and so on. (Telephone interview with a former officer,
February 2015)
In the investigations in Egypt, we extract truth through torture; the investigative
officer has no other tool to investigate the truth. They are not trained on discussions,
interrogation, and presenting suspects with some evidence, analyzing their
confessions to detect any inconsistency. These skills are not taught to them. The only
way is to beat the suspect until he confesses or confesses about any other suspect.
And unfortunately, in so many cases, some suspects would confess a crime they have
never done just to escape the torture. (Telephone interview with a former officer,
February 2015)
Torture was the main tool of investigations to solve criminal cases. The less we used
it, fearing human rights NGOs, the fewer cases we solved. That is bad, but it is the
truth. (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.73)
When we stopped the beatings, the rate of solved cases dramatically dropped
(telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)
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Therefore, the police's major problem is that the officers lack objective tools to
solve cases other than violating suspects' basic rights. This negatively impacts their
ability to work effectively and deeply harms their public image. On one hand, some
citizens refuse to report crimes, since they are aware of the police's limited capacities
in terms of investigations and suspects' arrests. On the other hand, some avoid
reporting a potential suspect to the police over fears that it will result in human rights
violations against the suspect. A third part of society avoids interacting with the police
altogether, even for reporting a crime, since they fear being taken in as suspects for
any unresolved crime. Therefore, there is a growing possibility for falsely-solved
crimes based on forced confessions, which reflects a deep mistrust of police
performance (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp.97-99 and p. 65).
However, violence is not only used for functional reasons to solve cases or
obtain a forced confession. In other words, police officers and sub-officers apply
violence for a variety of reasons other than solving cases. Several incidents of torture
have occurred in public places, not just in police stations or interrogation rooms, in
order to enforce a certain level of deterrence for those who might consider breaking
the law or contradicting police orders. As one officer explained:
The best way to preserve security was during El-Adly's era, when everyone was
afraid of interacting with the police. By that time, a general policy of deterrence was
applied on the whole society, which is missing today, and so, it is hard to address
security deficiencies since 2011. (Telephone interview with an officer, March 2015)

Accordingly, most of the cases that are reported through checkpoints are illegally
built, and thus they are not transferred to courts but will rather be disregarded by
prosecutors. Nevertheless, these cases are of huge importance for the internal reports
of the interior ministry, since they reflect what is commonly called "the effort." This
concept reflects the performance rates of each directorate and department in the
interior ministry, and thus the amount of activities undertaken by each director or
department head. Because of this "effort", most of officers are required to increase
their activity to meet or increase their previous records, in order to please their
superiors, who in turn seek to please their respective superiors. Based on this effort,
the interior ministry's effectiveness reports are built, regardless of the solidness of the
reported cases and whether they are transferred to court or disregarded by prosecutors.
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Therefore, the real interest of officers is directed to these fake performance reports
and not to substantially preserving security (M. Abulezz, 2013. pp.81-87).
Another aspect of work techniques is the security presence, which was initiated by
El-Adly to ensure the political visibility of the interior ministry. According to this
technique, police forces are divided into small groups around vital establishments in
urban areas to ensure their security. Hence, these forces solely serve the security of
these establishments and do not have any authority to address citizens who might seek
their help. As one former officer explains:
You are required to stand in front of these establishments for 12 hours a day doing
nothing, but when any citizen seeks your help about any security incident on the
street, you are not authorized to help him, except by calling the police emergency on
the famous hotline 122. (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.112)

There was a general assumption that the large number of police officers and
soldiers spread around every important establishment will automatically preserve
security by deterring anyone from breaking the law. But in reality, these ineffective
and distracting work techniques absorb the efforts of police personnel, without
ensuring any improvements in security. Moreover, such a monotonous technique
negatively impacts officers' willingness and enthusiasm to work (M. Abulezz, 2013,
p.112). Therefore, most of the real police work regarding investigations, public order,
and police patrols is actually carried out by the sub-officers. In terms of numbers, the
police sub-officers are approximately eight to 10 times more than the police officers.
Hence, assuming that police officers number around 40,000, sub-officers consist of
around 320,000 to 400,000 (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015). As
one officer explained, the sub-officers are in charge of most of the dirty work done by
the interior ministry, whether during investigations, interrogations, or arrests. In some
cases, officers are obliged to use work techniques adopted by sub-officers to solve a
case, since they do not have other options, considering the poor work conditions and
the pressure that they endure from their superiors. Thus, if a freshly graduated officer
is keen to apply the right procedures that he learned at the academy, he will face
resistance from his elder sub-officers, even if they work under his authority. He
cannot replace them; indeed, he needs them, since they are more familiar than he is
with the community (Email interview with a police officer, February 2015).
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The Sub-officers receive legal and police instruction at the Institute of Police SubOfficers. Yet their most valuable asset is that they deeply infiltrate the community in
which they are serving, thus managing a wide network of thugs to support the MOI's
dirty work when necessary. The MOI outsources these networks to intimidate political
opponents or keep it unofficially informed about criminal gangs in rural areas or
slums. Yet these networks are not keen to enforce the law. Rather, they enforce their
own authority, benefiting from their relation with the MOI. They also apply multiple
illegal techniques in the process, such as bribes and extortion (T. Aclimandos, 2012,
p.2-3). Moreover, some of these thugs use their authority to report their local enemies
to the MOI, instead of those who are actually breaking the law, without any potential
control over the credibility of the information they are providing (Moheyeldeen, 2014,
p.6). These networks are used as information tools which help in building cases in
their respective areas, with the relationship orchestrated by the sub-officers. (Personal
interview with a human rights expert, February 2015)
There is deep tension between the officers and sub-officers, in terms of work
division and salary disparities. Sub-officers legally have the right to join the officers'
ranks if they accomplish 25 years of service or acquire a law degree and then join the
police academy to graduate as molazem awal. Nevertheless, El-Adly was reluctant to
apply this condition in order to preserve the interior ministry's social selection over its
police officers. But after the 2011 revolution, sub-officers conducted several protests
and strikes to call for the promotion of qualified sub-officers to the rank of officer (B.
Abdelaziz, 2013, p165). As one officer explained:
Mahmoud Wagdy (interior minister right after the revolution, between January and
March, 2011) decided to accept some of them as officers and there are almost 40,000
waiting to be promoted. This way, the number of officers who were previously subofficers will exceed those who were originally officers. This will deeply alter their
jobs, because they are from lower social backgrounds and adopt illegal work
techniques and are highly corrupt, even partnering with criminal gangs in different
areas. (Email interview with a police officer, February, 2015)
I agree that the sub-officer manages most of the dirty work of the police, but they are
not responsible for all the violations. There are plenty of officers who violate the
people's rights, too. (Personal interview with a human rights researcher, March

2015)

Being from a lower social background is not generally a crime, but it can be a
disqualifying criterion for the MOI against those who wish to join the police academy.
As one human rights' researcher explains:
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The rationale behind establishing the sub-officer rank in the late sixties was to spare
the police officer who is generally the son of the middle or higher classes from
working in poorer areas and lower social backgrounds. Hence, recruiting a subofficer from lower classes as an intermediary to support police work in marginalized
areas was the major goal of the MOI at that time. This was an important idea to
infiltrate these communities... so the sub-officer is the government in the eyes of
poorer areas, but the officer is the representation of the government for the higher
classes. (Personal interview with a human rights researcher, February, 2015)

The problem is that sub-officers might not solely be working for the police, since
their low wages oblige them to work in other economic activities. Thus, they work
with the police to illegally protect these activities, or financially benefit from their
authority as policemen to receive bribes and practice extortion. As one former officer
explains:
It does not matter if their salaries are increased, because they are already corrupted.
For instance, they tend to gain LE15,000 through corruption, so when the MOI
increases their salaries for instance from LE800LE to LE3,000 per month, it does not
stop their corrupt activities. They might only decrease them, but they continue to gain
the same amount of illegally earned money. (Telephone interview with a former
officer, February 2015)

Nevertheless, corruption in police work is not only practiced in lower ranking
levels, meaning it is not the sole responsibility of sub-officers. The MOI manages a
variety of economic activities, the profit of which is not included in the official state
budget. This explains the disparity between the official budget of the MOI of around
LE23 billion and other estimation of the budget ranging around LE85 billion, as
previously mentioned (O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). As one officer explains:
There are plenty of profitable companies - bakeries, restaurants offering food and
drinks for the security forces and Central Security Forces. There are also the farms
and galleries of the prison authorities, where the workers are prisoners or the interior
ministry's conscripts (. . .) these activities gain millions of pounds, and this is all
illegal because they do not appear in the interior ministry's budget, and the Central
Agency for Auditing is not aware of [this money]… from these millions, the big
colonels of the MOI receive huge salaries that could amount to LE1 million per
month for each of them... this is a fact that everyone knows, but tell me, how can I
work properly knowing this, while my salary is barely meeting the effort I am putting
out by working on the streets every day? (Email Interview with a police officer,
February, 2015

Such monetary figures could be exaggerated, even if it coincides with another
estimation by former high ranking officers who stated that almost LE4 billion were
allocated for annual loyalty payments for around 350 liwā' and 'amīd from El-Adly's
close circle, which means that each of them received almost LE1 million per month
(O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). Nevertheless, these profitable economic activities could be
legal, even if they do not appear in the official budget of the MOI. Yet, the problem is
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that this "unofficial" budget is the reason for a long conflict with the Central Agency
for Auditing (CAA) that started after the 2011 revolution. The MOI has constantly
refused CAA auditors access to its financial documents, despite several mediations,
especially by the current Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahleb. According to the CAA's
head, Hisham Genena (2012 to present), the CAA was given access to the financial
documents of the defense ministry but was denied the same with the interior ministry
(El-Mogy 2014). Most of the interior ministry's hidden budget is managed through
special funds which are legally put outside the State's budget. These funds include the
officers' retirement payments, as well as the fines collected by the ministry itself.
Some of the preliminary reports of the CAA concluded that the MOI runs many
officers' solidarity funds, which receive monthly contributions from every officer who
wishes to receive a large sum in return upon his retirement. However, the investment
of these funds is not audited by the CAA and could amount to several billion Egyptian
pounds (Alzanaty & Abufaddan 2014). Each police department has its respective
solidarity funds, but the amount received by each officer upon his retirement varies
according to the years of subscription and the report of his superiors prior to his
retirement. Therefore, these funds are used to keep most of the officers loyal to the
status quo within the interior ministry; otherwise, their retirement payments will be
negatively impacted. Hence, this study does not claim to generate new findings
regarding the budget figures of the MOI, it rather relies on several estimations to
highlight that the current management of these funds deepens the sense of inequality
among the interviewed officers.
Accordingly, the promotion criteria within the MOI help to preserve the status
quo. After graduation, an officer gets his first rank as molazīm awwál for three years,
then naqib for seven years, and then he continues to escalate the ranking hierarchy
according to his year of graduation and number of years in service. Nevertheless,
starting from 'amīd, promotions depend greatly on the reports of an officer's superiors,
who decide who is promoted to liwā' and who is brought to retirement (email
interview with an officer, March 2015). Therefore, whoever tries to expose corruption
or apply changes that conflict with the interior ministry's policy, is generally sent to
retirement with the rank of 'amīd, with a lower retirement payment than his
colleagues. As a former officer elaborates:
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Any officer who tries to stop this corruption will be punished having his retirement
payment decreased. They work as a network to isolate and punish any clean-handed
officer who wants to report about them… Thus, we thought that we should create a
coalition for the good officers in order to coordinate and protect ourselves in the
same way as the corrupted officers… This was the main idea behind forming a
coalition for police officers to demand their rights for a suitable salary and humane
work conditions. (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

Hence, several officers, right after the 2011 revolution, decided to form a general
coalition for police officers in order to expose corruption within the top ranks and
support the civilian effort to cleanse the interior ministry. The idea was welcomed by
thousands of officers who enrolled in the coalition, and the body began to voice
officers' demands for improvements in salaries and work conditions. In March 2012,
the coalition was transformed into a general syndicate which negotiated with the MOI
for new raises in officers' salaries, which amounted to increases of 300% (AlShorouk, 21-6-2012), and limited the working hours of officers from around 14 to
eight 8 hours per day. As one officer explains:
We used to work between 14 and 16 hours a day, but after the revolution the MOI
positively responded to officers' demands and lowered the working hours to only
eight or nine hours… Before, I used to work from 8am to 4pm, then have a break and
start working again from 7pm to 12am, or maybe more. Now I am not required to
return to work in a night shift. But in reality, there is no one to replace me, and the
work is not done properly without my presence. (Telephone interview with a police
officer, February 2015)

Despite the visible attempt of the MOI to appease the demands of a wide range of
officers, it firmly punished all active officers who insisted on creating an independent
syndicate with an elected leadership. Hence, around 32 officers from the active group
who helped create the general syndicate were subject to administrative investigations
within the interior ministry (Al-youm al-sabae', 21-3-2012). Finally, the ministry
managed to reach an agreement with the general syndicate group to disregard their
punishments in return for abstaining from contacting the media. Afterwards, the
purpose of the syndicate shifted to organizing free elections for the administrative
boards of the officers' clubs, following the model of the judges' clubs (telephone
interview with a former officer, March 2015). Accordingly, the first election was
conducted in April 2013, via electronic votes, with a turnout of around 40% among
officers on duty (Al-Watan 28-4-2013)4. Following this, officers' demands for reforms

4

13,953 out of a total of 34,787 officers on duty, and 2,187 out of 9,776 retired officers, voted
in these elections, with a turnout rate of 40 % for officers on duty and 22.5% for retired officers. For
further information, see: Al-Watan newspaper, 28-4-2013
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were generally met, which in return decreased the importance and the popularity of an
independent syndicate among police officers.

E- Accountability
The accountability of the police is the major criterion that differentiates a democratic
force from others. Therefore, as accountability mechanisms become more diverse and
are exercised by different actors, the police apparatus will better correspond to
democratic norms and values. In theory, police work can be controlled and overseen
by multiple actors, whether civilian overseers or those from a police background. In
all cases, the multiplicity of overseers does not hinder accountability but rather serves
as a multi-layered system of checks and balances to guarantee a perfect
implementation of police work. Thus, the police should have an internal authority to
supervise officers' performance and investigate any complaint filed against its
personnel. The judiciary has great authority in determining the legality of work
techniques applied by the police, and this authority is utilized, whether by the final
courts or preliminary prosecutors.
In the Egyptian case, the MOI has a special department for internal control, called
altaftīsh, which reviews officers' performance and investigates complaints filed
against them. As a result, the altaftīsh has the authority to conduct an administrative
investigation with an officer and decide on a suitable punishment. Generally, the
punishments can range from a verbal warning to registered mistakes in the officer's
administrative file, which could impact his career path and determine the placement
of his future service. Most of the officers interviewed for this study perceived the
internal control department as very firm in investigating an officers' misconduct.
However, there was wide divergence about whether the altaftīsh applies the same fair
rules across all the cases it investigates. The internal control inspectors generally
conduct random field inspections on police forces in different areas to check on their
readiness, yet the exact criteria upon which they build their judgments are unclear. In
fact, the interviewed officers were critical about inspectors' superficial remarks
concerning their appearance and not their actual readiness and fitness. As a former
officer explains:
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All they care about is being in shape… clean shaven ... putting the whole uniform on,
with shining shoes…if I was trained lately on shooting or not… how many bullets I
have in my pockets and if I fired any of them lately (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.107-108)
This might appear superficial, but it is serious. Imagine the stress the officer will be
in when he is wearing his white uniform and dealing with people involved in violent
disputes, and is all covered in blood, and in the middle of all that he must keep his
white uniform clean, or otherwise he might be punished by the internal control
authority. (Personal interview with a journalist, February 2015)

Moreover, the internal inspection could investigate certain cases upon the request
of officers, especially chief officers. As one officer emphasizes:
My boss reported on me because I fired several bullets in the air to foil an escape
attempt led by the prisoners' relatives on our police station... nobody was killed,
nobody was injured… but I solved the problem and saved the lives of my colleagues
with these few bullets… My boss reported on me because he did not want to share
the responsibility of wasting these bullets… you know, the bullets are 'ohda (legally
guarded)… He testified against me, but the inspector did not listen to me and directly
believed him… My career path was negatively impacted by this incident. I was
arbitrarily transferred and I have served in bad places since then. (Telephone

interview with an officer, March 2015)

Another officer explained:
They will never admit that a naqīb is saying the truth and that an 'aqīd is lying. They
will directly believe the higher ranking [officer]… who can protect me if I want to
report about my boss's deviation? Nobody (Telephone interview with an officer,

February 2015)

However, some officers feel that the punishment procedures taken by inspectors
can easily be omitted if the officer in question has a strong connection in the
leadership of the interior ministry. As one former officer described his experience
with the inspection:
It was used against me, to punish me for trying to report on some corrupt colleagues,
not to really investigate the matter of corruption. (Telephone interview with a former
officer, March 2015)

Another officer elaborated on this point:
Nepotism is really common in this case… Let me tell you, if I commit a mistake
jointly with another officer, and he has a strong connection, I might be strictly
punished and he will probably survive without even an investigation... The case will
be omitted from his file and inserted in mine… It's as simple as that. (Telephone
interview with an officer, March 2015)

Generally, the internal control investigates matters of discipline, conduct,
performance, and eventually, police brutality. However, it seems that the matter of
discipline and following superiors' orders is more important to the inspection than
other matters of brutality. Therefore, taken into consideration the limitation of the
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sample, there is a general perception that the MOI tolerates the systematic brutality
that leads to cases being solved, and some functional brutality to intimidate political
opponents, especially that carried out by the SSI/NSA. Therefore, there are multiple
cases of torture and extra-legal killings conducted by SSI officers during
interrogations that have passed without a minor investigation (O. Ashour, 2012, p.7).
Nevertheless, other incidents show that the MOI did not tolerate random brutality
from off-duty officers for personal reasons; hence, these officers were accused of
intended murder and transferred to courts (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p83). A former officer
considered the case of Khaled Said as an exception of the standard policy in this
regard, explaining:
Khalid Said's case wasn't a political case to insist on protecting the sub-officers
accused of his murder, because El-Adly was only keen to protect the SSI officers.
But those working in criminal security did not receive the same attention and
protection. He could have sacrificed one or two officers for justice to appease the
public opinion, but he didn't… that is why the situation escalated to wide protests.
(M. Abulezz, 2014. P.123)

The judiciary system serves as an oversight mechanism that scrutinizes police
work on several levels. In the 1980s, when the police applied systematic torture to
solve terrorism cases, the courts granted more than 190 acquittals after determining
that the suspects' confessions had been violently extracted. Accordingly, around 41
officers were transferred to the criminal courts for applying torture during
interrogations for these cases (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.64). Yet this a posteriori
oversight mechanism did not seem to stop police brutality in interrogations,
considering that it still persists as a systematic tool for building cases. The cases of
Khaled Said in June 2010 and Sayed Belal in December 2010, both occurring, in
Alexandria, reflected the continuance of deadly police brutality. Both cases were
reinvestigated after the revolution, under pressure from the revolutionary coalitions,
and resulted in 10-year sentences for the two sub-officers involved in the killing of
Khaled Said, a 15-year sentence for a SSI officer, and acquittals for four other officers
who were previously accused in the killing of Sayed Belal (Marssadpress16-4-2013).
On the other hand, almost all of the public officials during the 2011 revolution,
including high ranking officials from the interior ministry, were granted acquittals.
Thus, the judiciary has distinguished between killings that occurred during the
revolution and those that occurred in police custody. In fact, the acquittal verdicts for
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those charged with killing protesters during the revolution were built upon the concept
of the prevalence of mass killings, in a way that impedes collecting strong evidence or
specifying responsibility. This totally ignores the extraction of several "official
bullets" from the bodies of those who were killed across Cairo and Giza during the
revolution (Hesham 2015). Yet the verdicts were guided by a different logic, which
was the concept of self-defense applied by officers to protect their police stations
from being invaded or burned following mass protests. As one officer explained:
The officers were only arrested to appease public opinion, but what they did to
defend their police stations was 100% legal, as the law gives them the right to fire on
whoever tries to break into a police station. (Telephone interview with a police
officer, February 2015)

A former officer further clarified the matter:
If I was serving in a police station at that time, I would think of protecting my station,
the weapons and the legal registries in there, as well as the lives of the soldiers
serving under my authority. Then I would leave to protect my own family. This
would be my priority, so I cannot blame these officers, yet I cannot blame the
protestors either. It was a complicated situation (…) the judges could not actually
specify responsibility in these murders (…) it was insane to transfer these murders to
ordinary criminal justice procedures… They should have been dealt with delicately.
(M. Abulezz, 2014, pp. 126-127)

On the other hand, the only one of these incidents to be investigated was the case
of 37 prisoners who were killed in a police truck at Abo-Za'bel prison right after the
Rabi'a dispersal in August 2013. The prisoners were kept in the vehicle under the sun
for 12 hours with no food or drink, and when they asked to be released they were hit
with tear gas, resulting in the deaths of 37 out of 45 prisoners. Four officers were
accused of applying violence that resulted in unintentional murder. One officer was
sentenced to 10 years in jail, while the three others received one year. But later on, the
officers' appeal was accepted and the case was transferred to the public prosecution
for new investigations (Al-tahrir 22-1-2015).
As part of the justice system, prosecutors play an important role in reviewing the
police’s role, examining the legal procedures applied by the police and deciding if a
case should be transferred to the courts. Hence, when a prosecutor decides to
disregard a case, it means that he holds the police incompetent in building strong
cases to be transferred to the courts. But it is quite controversial to use this issue as a
measurement for the police performance or for the degree of the prosecutors'
oversight over the police work. Prosecutors can confirm cases that are not strongly
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built but that will be acquitted in future court verdicts (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p. 121).
As one officer explained:
When the prosecutor disregards a case, that means that the procedures applied were
wrong which is very common because no one in the police applies the right legal
procedures in building cases. In the police report, they usually describe a completely
invented story about the search and the arrest… but it could also reflect that the
whole case was not worth reporting. (Personal interview with a police officer,
February 2015)

This was underlined by a former officer in a different way:
I was constantly called by the prosecutors to sign the disregarded cases that I reported
at the checkpoint where I served… I knew that the cases were nothing, but I was
obliged to report them to increase my reporting rates at the interior ministry… But I
was truly relieved to learn that the prosecutors had disregarded the cases because
they were nonsense. (M. Abulezz, 2014, p. 83 & 86)

Similarly, another officer discusses the authority granted to prosecutors:
We have no other choice than using violence against suspects to solve cases, but we
should apply physical violence that does not leave any trace or evidence to be
identified by the prosecutors, otherwise the case will be blown and disregarded.
(Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer explained:
Judicial oversight is not just a theory; it is actually present and activated. There is no
way that an officer who shot a suspect, causing his death, will not be tried. He is
immediately transferred to the general prosecution and will be held in jail for four
days and with his detention then renewed. Judicial oversight is activated and the
general prosecutors maintain a really formal relationship with the officers when they
commit a mistake that mandates a trial, there is no exception in that, I am telling you.
(Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015)

Nevertheless, the oversight applied by prosecutors is neither absolute nor holistic.
In theory, prosecutors have the legal authority to inspect a police station, its detaining
cells, prisons, interrogation rooms, and to protect detainees from any potential torture.
Yet they might not be keen to hold police officers accountable for these offences, due
to reasons that include sympathies with the officers’ personal networks, since a large
portion of prosecutors were former police officers (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, p9). As one
officer explains:
They have the legal authority to check on everything, but do they do it? Or can they
practically do it? This will depend on so many things, if they want to control
everything they can, and if they want to let go, they will, and nobody can question
their decision. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

The same logic was elaborated upon by another officer:
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The prosecutor can, in theory, oversee all police work in terms of procedures and
detention cells and everything, but if he does so and strictly controls everything, the
police officers will not send a car or guarding soldiers to accompany the prosecutor at
every crime scene investigation… the whole benefit-exchange formula between the
officer and the prosecutor will explode. (Personal interview with an officer, February
2015)

On the other hand, there are some legal limitations to prosecutors' oversight of
police work. The law specifies that the party who filed the complaint must provide the
related supporting evidence; hence, in cases of police brutality in custody, the
detainee who faced torture is requested to provide evidence supporting his complaint.
As a former officer clarified:
According to the law, if you said I was subject to torture, you have to prove it, but the
whole situation is under the authority of the police and occurred in police custody, so
it is always possible for the police to ruin evidence and upset the case. (Telephone
interview with a former officer, February 2015)

The prosecutors' authority to oversee the police is quite contestable and depends
on the situation of each incident. In some cases, there is political support for the
general prosecutor to investigate police brutality, like for instance the case of
Shaymaa Al-Sabagh, a peaceful protestor who was shot dead in January 2015. The
prosecutors thoroughly investigated the matter and even punished a senior police
officer for misleading the investigation, then identified the police officer who was
involved in shooting Al-Sabagh with a cartridge rifle (Al-Shourouk 17-3-2015). In
this regard, the media played an important role in presenting clear evidence that
proved the officer's responsibility, which forced the public prosecutor to act on the
matter. However, other incidents which were not fully covered by the media received
other treatment. In other cases such as the dispersal of Rabi'a and Nahda sit-ins,
which resulted in the mass killings of a large number of protestors5, none of the police
officers who served on that day were prosecuted for murder. The National Council of
Human Rights official report on the sit-ins’ dispersals criticized the interior ministry's
5

The National Council for Human Rights reported 632 cases of killings, including eight
policemen in the sit-in dispersals and around 686 cases of killings, including 64 policemen in different
clashes in several governorates following the dispersals. However, Human Rights Watch reported 817
cases of killings by the security forces in the sit-in dispersals, added to 246 others killed in different
clashes in other governorates. Full reports are available at:
http://elbadil.com/2014/03/06/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5-and at:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0814ar_ForUpload_0.pdf - retrieved on 18-12-2014
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disproportionate use of force and recommended judicial investigation in this regard,
yet none of these cases were examined by the public prosecutor. Hence, the decision
to prosecute a police officer is quite controversial and depends on the political
environment of each incident, rather than equally applying general rules to all cases.
Parliamentarian oversight on police work is widely impacted by political balance
of power. The interior minister usually presents an annual report to parliament in a
public session (when it is functioning), yet this does not mean that the parliament has
any substantial authority over the MOI (Bakr & Said, 2011, p.9). On the contrary,
during Mubarak's rule, this annual report was an occasion to show the interior
minister’s power over the parliament. For instance, Zaki Badr, interior minister in
1990s, slapped a parliament member in the middle of a hearing session for protesting
the content of Badr's speech6. Later, between 2005 and 2010, most of the opposition
parliamentarians presented multiple interrogations to the interior minister about
torture at police stations. However, parliamentary bureaucracy manipulated the
situation to avoid any serious employment of parliamentarian tools against the interior
minister (Ne'matallah 2009). After the revolution, the minister addressed the
parliament in February 2012, denying the use of firearms to control the popular
protests following the Portsaid massacre7. But a parliamentary committee investigated
the clashes near the MOI's headquarters in Cairo and collected evidence of the use of
firearms and cartridges to forcibly disperse the protesters. Accordingly, a
parliamentary committee investigating the Portsaid massacre highlighted the MOI's
failure to secure the football match and confiscate weapons carried into the stadium
by some of the fans (Al-masry al-youm 12-2-2012). Such oversight mechanisms had a
limited role in orienting the police work, even though the minister was keen to
emphasize the MOI's improved performance in respecting people's rights. Thus far,
with the exception of inquiries and hearing sessions, parliamentarian oversight has
never reached the stage of politically punishing a minister as a result of the police

6

A video of this incident is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOwwiF4vzBQ –
retrieved on 20-3-2015
7
In a football match held in Portsaid, 73 of Al-Ahly club supporters were killed when trying to
exit the football stadium with visible police failure in protecting the masses, in an incident that was
perceived as a police conspiracy against Al-Ahly club supporters who were in the frontline of the
January 25th revolution.
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deviation. Generally, parliamentarian oversight has a limit in inspecting police work,
as one officer explained:
Parliament members are not competent to oversee our work, you know why? They
used to come to inspect the prisons and detention cells, especially the committee of
defense and national security. But everyone in this committee has a relative that he
wants to join the police academy or needs to be employed at a certain place but is
waiting for a security approval. Tell me how they will be fair monitors in this regard.
They will never try to escalate the situation if they find something wrong. This is not
about us, it is the problem of the community as a whole. Why do you elect these
people in the first place, when all they care about are their own interests? (Telephone
interview with an officer, February 2015)

This view could partly explain the parliament’s limited authority regarding the
MOI's misconduct. Yet, the MOI has a direct interest in keeping the bargaining with
the politicians possible in order to escape any democratic control over its
performance. Additionally, political balances in parliament have never resulted in a
strong majority that is determinant to impact the ministry’s security policy. In the
2012 Parliament, the comity of the Defense and the National Security was active in
discussing the police reform initiatives, yet, it finally passed a bill that focused only
on raising the salaries and exempting the police personnel from military trials
(Personal interview with a human rights expert, February 2015). Hence, several
opportunities have been wasted to build political consensus in order to enforce
civilian control over police work.
Concerning the interior ministry's budget, it was never thoroughly discussed in
parliament, since the ministry's budget is presented as a total amount without details
of expenditure. Parliament has passed constant raises in the MOI's share of the state
budget since 2005 (Abdel-Rady 2011)8, yet between 2012 and 2013, just one year, the
MOI's budget jumped from LE18 billion to LE23.5 billion. Similarly, the 2013/2014
budget consisted of a LE10 billion raise in the MOI's share of the state budget (Almasry al-youm 13-5-2013). The main argument for these raises was to provide the
ministry with suitable resources to build its capacities and regain control over the
country’s deteriorating security conditions. Yet there was no reform regarding the
arrangements of the budget, and it wasn’t discussed, with the exception of some
parliamentarian complaints concerning its ambiguity (Gharib 2013). Moreover, the
lower house of parliament did not get the chance to ratify the 2012/2013 state budget
8

Many estimations considered the interior ministry's yearly budget to be between LE3-4
billion, but between 2002 and 2005, the budget was raised to LE12 billion.
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introduced under the authority of the SCAF, because it was dissolved before
concluding the budget discussions. But the shoura council, the upper house of
parliament, discussed the 2013/2014 budget and ratified it with no substantial
amendments to the MOI's portion, just days before the June 30, 2013 mass protests.
From the governmental side, the oversight mechanism on the police is
primarily practiced by the president, who usually tends to replace the interior minister
after outstanding failures. For instance, Ahmed Roushdy (1984-1986) in the eighties
was replaced by Zaki Bard (1986-1990) after the famous protest incidents conducted
by soldiers from the Central Security Forces (CSF)9, which urged the military to
intervene and repress the strike. Yet other analysis considers that Roushdy was
dismissed for conducting serious corruption investigations that involved several
ministers and government officials (Arafat 2013). Similarly, Hassan Al-Alfy was
replaced by Habib El-Adly in 1997 after a terrorist attack on tourist attractions in
Luxor that killed around 60 persons mostly tourists (the Economist 20-11-1997).
Also, following the 2011 revolution, El-Adly was replaced by Mahmoud Wagdy, who
stayed in office two months before being replaced by Mansour El-Essawy. Moreover,
El-Essawy himself stayed in office for seven months only and was replaced in
December 2011 by Mohamed Ibrahim Youssef. The latter stayed in office for nine
months, until he was replaced by Ahmed Gamal El-Din in August 2012. Hence, every
appointment of a new interior minister was received by the country’s political powers
as a chance for reform as well as a form of political punishment to the previous
minister. This was especially the case of Gamal El-Din, who was dismissed in
January 2013 after refusing to forcibly suppress anti-Morsi protests near the Ittihādiya
presidential palace a month earlier. Therefore, Mohamed Ibrahim, who came to office
following Gamal El-Din, was perceived as the minister of Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood. However, this turned out to be false, since Ibrahim was involved with
the military in ousting Morsi on July 3, 2013, and violently dispersing his supporters'
sit-ins in August 2013. Later, in March 2015, Ibrahim was replaced by Magdy AbdelGhaffar after consecutive security failures, among them terrorist attacks in Sinai and
an enormous fire that ruined the Cairo International Conference Center in the east
district of Nasr City (Thabet 2015).
9

In 1986, thousands of military conscripts within the central security forces staged a wide riot
to protest a rumor of a potential extension of their military duty for one more year
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However, the most effective type of accountability in Egypt was actually
practiced by the human rights NGOs and the media. The most tangible reform
initiative was presented by a group of civil society organizations, law professors and
police officers that was called the National Initiative for Police Reform NIPR. The
NIPR emphasized the different angles of the police reform especially the police
accountability. As one security studies' researcher involved in drafting the NIPR
formula explained:
In our first draft we emphasized the most radical suggestions for reform, and then we
lightened it gradually in October 2011, then in 2012 and in 2013. Thus the first
version was really sharp in requesting the prosecution of the officers involved in the
killings during the revolution and this was particularly the demand of the officers
involved with us who perceived an active accountability as a mechanism to purify the
police from the bad elements, because they did not want to share responsibility in
those killings (Personal interview with a security studies' researcher, March 2015)

Another activist in the NIPR explained:
Our essential emphasize was on the accountability and on the settlement of the
previous crimes committed by the MOI, which are committed until today, and will
continue until the reform actually begins. The society is full of victims of the MOI's
crimes who were not compensated by any means. So if we wanted to build a stable
and productive society served by a legitimate police force, the police violations
should be accountable for (Personal interview with a human rights' activist, March
2015)

Most of the cases of brutality which were investigated by prosecutors and
transferred to courts were primarily supported with wide media coverage and accurate
documentation by human rights NGOs. The Khaled Said case in 2010 was an example
of this right before the January 25 th revolution, followed by the Shaymaa Al-Sabagh
case in 2015 after the July 3 rd 2013. A prominent NGO that has been involved in
holding the police accountable is the Al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of
Violence Victims, which has played a prominent role in documenting the majority of
police brutality incidents, whether those occurring in police custody or other places.
The center also notably published a report after the first 100 days of Morsi's
presidency to expose continuing violations. Afterwards, the center reported 359 cases
of torture and 217 cases of killings by the police or in clashes that the police failed to
control during Morsi's rule (Al-Nadeem Center, 2013). Similarly, the center published
a well-documented report about incidents of torture and death committed by the
police after the June 30 revolution under the rules of interim president Adly Mansour
and elected President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi (Al-Nadeem Center 2014). These detailed
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reports were based on the personal testimonials of hundreds who survived the
violence and torture, as well as sources from both traditional and new media.
Moreover, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights published a similar and more
elaborate report to document the killings that occurred in the summer of 2013,
following the Rabi'a and Nahda dispersals (EIPR 2014). Although these reports
documenting extrajudicial killings were important in raising awareness about the rate
of the violations, they didn’t put enough pressure on enforcing the prosecution of the
incidents’ perpetrators. However, the case of lawyer Karim Hamdy, who died from
torture in a police station in February 2015, proved that the wide protests conducted
by the Lawyers' Syndicate played a prominent role in forcing the prosecution of two
NSA officers who were involved in his death (Al-Watan 1-3-2015). Hence, civil
institutions endorsing specific cases of violence will likely play an effective role in
police accountability, compared to other cases which were not endorsed. Moreover,
the more visible the case is in the media and the wider the alliance is that requests its
investigation, the greater the probability that its perpetrators' will be prosecuted. Yet,
not all cases of violation are equally endorsed, and so not all cases are properly
investigated.
Accordingly, when Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper published in April 2015 a
well documented report about the police violations, the MOI threatened to prosecute
the newspaper for publishing false incidents. The MOI has been always unwelcoming
any type of criticism regarding its performance, claiming any abuse incident
conducted by the police to be exceptional and unrepresentative of the general conduct
of the MOI. However, the MOI is deliberately intimidating the media outlets which
persist on exposing the wrongdoing of its personnel, since the wide media coverage of
the police abuses will enforce the investigation of violence incidents and the
prosecution of the perpetrators.
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VII- Recommendations for Police Reform in Egypt

In this part the different views regarding the police reform are discussed and
contrasted in order to highlight the reform formula that could be applicable in Egypt.
The reform views are based on the insights of the interviewed police officers and
human rights' experts, yet articulated around the four criteria of the democratic
policing as discussed earlier in the analytical framework.
A. Political Neutrality
Despite the importance of the political neutrality of the police, the police reform itself
requires a political will favorable of the reform. Hence, the main question in this
regard was how to trigger the political will to introduce the police reform. Some of the
interviewees considered that convincing the current authority to stop using the police
as a political tool to suppress its opponents would be hard since a politicized police is
definitely consolidating its power. In this regard, the trigger for the reform could be a
second wave of police collapse which is similar to what happened on January 28 th
2011. Such a collapse would oblige the current rulers to allow a political opening
leading to a general initiative of institutional reform including the police reform. As a
sociologist explained:
In some times, when the authority's structure reaches a certain level of depth and
complexity, a certain level of violence is needed to penetrate this depth and dismantle
its structure. The MOI is like a wildlife predator, it should be first beaten, then well
fed and nurtured before you can expect anything from it (Personal Interview with a
sociologist, March 2015)

In contrast, others considered that a complete collapse is not required, because the
MOI is already aware of its deficiencies since the first collapse on January 28 th, 2011.
Therefore, this view perceives the adoption of the reform as applicable if approached
from the professionalism angle which gives priority to improving the officers'
salaries, work conditions and training. As explained by a human rights journalist:
The police was already engaged in June 30 as a partner with other political trends
against the MB, thus we can build on this partnership to introduce a wider scale of
reform based primarily on improving their work conditions, then come other aspects
of reform such as the accountability and the de-militarization and so on… And this
could easily happen without a need for a second beat, like the way it was in January
28th, we might not survive another beat for the police, the situation is already
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precarious and fragile. We cannot actually control the scale of a second beat, so we
cannot get its benefits, if any. (Personal interview with a journalist, February 2015)

Opposed to this view, another view considered that the reform should be tackled
in a holistic approach where all angles of reform are introduced in parallel. As
explained by a political science scholar:
The people will never accept to postpone the police accountability, even if there is no
parliament for a while, the people will refuse that with lots of other mechanisms. The
police accountability is crucial because with every victim killed, the political regime
will gain more enemies and its stability will be at the stack, hence, the regime's
legitimacy will be deeply harmed by the absence of the accountability (Personal
interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

In addition to that, a human rights activist explained:
The reform demands are really interdependent and interrelated. If there is no
monitoring mechanism for every measure of reform we propose, it will not be
implemented in a proper way, as if it was not applied at all. Therefore, without
multiple mechanisms of accountability, the reform has no core (Personal interview
with a human rights activist, March 2015)

Considering the same logic, the likelihood of the reform is tightly linked to the
regime's ability to control the political situation through the current police status.
Hence, the consecutive security crises will enforce the regime to adopt some
substantial reforms; otherwise it will face a second collapse. Thus a sociologist put it
in an "either/or" equation as follows:
Either the State allows certain spaces and discourses of reform that would eventually
help it later to evolve, or it considers that as an attempt to destroy its structures and
then ignore the reform until it is actually facing collapse by the constant failure and
deficiencies in its institutions especially the police. (Personal interview with a
sociologist, March 2015)

Regardless of the trigger for the introduction of the reform, a holistic approach
should be adopted when tackling the different angles of the reform. Thus, the
hypothesis of introducing some professional reforms before consolidating the
accountability mechanisms was widely refuted by most of the interviewees. Even, the
police officers requested a clear set of oversight mechanisms in order to properly fight
terrorism, to counter corruption within the apparatus and to widen the legitimacy of
the police action (Personal interview with a police officer, February 2015). As one
political science scholar put it:
The democracy consolidation is based on a bunch of sustainable reforms, amongst is
the police reform. The police reform is a substantial part of the implementation of the
social contract with the people …We have to consider all the aspects of reform
simultaneously, because they are interdependent, you cannot hold them accountable
if you do not give them effective tools of professional investigation ... we need to
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solve the dilemma of security and human rights. (Personal interview with a political
science scholar, March 2015)

As another political scientist added:
We cannot set effective oversight mechanism without consolidating an independent
judiciary and a strong parliament, the whole process of reform is interdependent, and
the police reform is not an isolated exception (Personal interview with a political
science scholar, February 2015)

Additionally, a police officer expressed the same view:
The security is better served if all of the State's institutions undergo a comprehensive
reform to overcome the deficiencies of the bureaucracy, because the work of the MOI
depends on many other institutions not only the police. (Email Interview with an
officer, March 2015)

Moreover, a human rights researcher emphasized the importance of tackling the
reform as a win/win situation for both sides; the police and the people. He elaborated
as follows:
The reform discourse should be approached as a win/win game not a zero sum game
between the MOI and the civil society, both sides should come out of it with
respective gains it is not a matter of revenge (Personal interview with a human rights'
researcher, March 2015)

Despite the importance of the holistic approach in tackling the police reform, some
interviewees stressed on gradual incremental steps to introduce the reform. As one
officer stated:
It should definitely be gradual, slow, and led by strong insider figures because most
probably the apparatus will not accept a reform plan from an outsider. There are
some institutions who will never accept an imposed reform from outside its
members, such as the judiciary and the police. Thus it should be introduced gradually
through some compromises, for instance, the salaries will be raised in exchange of
passing some reforms and additional tasks for the police and so on. If the reform is
pushed forward through radical immediate changes, the apparatus will resist and as a
result could stop functioning. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

On the contrary, other interviewees highlighted that the police is like any other
public institution, the personnel of which will directly follow the instructions of their
superiors. As a former police officer explained:
If the reform is adopted by a strong, competent and determinant minister, he would
probably change the whole ministry in one year (. . .) that is how the police doctrine
works, no matter who is in charge, the people in the organization will follow the new
rules with no thinking. It is actually a negative point, but when it comes to reform, it
turns to be positive because everyone will follow. A strong minister with a clear
vision and nontraditional methods would actually succeed in reforming the ministry
with no potential resistance (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February
2015)
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Yet another former officer refuting the possibility of adopting an accelerated plan
of reform has explained:
If an accelerated plan is imposed, the ordinary citizen would pay a high price. Yet to
implement a real reform, we have to design two plans, one for the short term and the
other for the long term. The short term means 6 months and the long term means
from 3 to 10 years, it does not matter, but we need a complete plan in hand before
starting to reform (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

On the other hand, a third former officer suggested specific steps to properly lunch
an effective reform process as follows:
First step should be a wide purge for all corrupted leaders in the MOI, then the
second step is to promote the mid-ranking officers to manage the reform, then the
third step is changing the curricula of the police academy. Those who might resist the
reform are dismissed, those who might embrace it are promoted and those who would
implement it are well educated and trained on new effective methods (Telephone
interview with a former officer, March 2015)

Yet a researcher in security studies articulated it differently by stating the
following:
The first step should be forming an assessment comity to investigate all of the MOI's
sectors then suggest a reform plan scheduled on both short and long term (. . .) there
is no unique formula of reform, each country has its own characteristics determining
the likelihood and conditions of reform, so we have to study our conditions and
suggest the needed reform accordingly (Personal interview with a security studies
researcher, March 2015)

Therefore, the preferable context of the police reform in Egypt would be a
political opening, whether based on a voluntary intention of reform from the regime
or urged by the severe collapse of the apparatus. Generally, a successful reform plan
should be based on the work of an assessment comity with diverse backgrounds with
the purpose of scanning all the capacities and deficiencies of the MOI to suggest
where to begin a short term reform and where to schedule a long term reform. In all
cases, a multiplicity of actors should be involved in suggesting and monitoring the
potential reforms, yet the importance of a civilian minister was contestable. Some of
the interviewees insisted on a civilian minister to undertake the reforms as a guarantee
that the reforms are implemented in the interest of the people. Whereas, an important
portion of the interviewees preferred an insider in order to avoid any potential
resistance. Thereby, the substance of the reform plan is the most important in this
regard, rather than the background of the minister who would initiate the reform.
However, the content of the reform should definitely be the result of a joint work of a
diversity of actors and experts from the different fields related to the police work.
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On the other hand, almost all of the interviewees emphasized the importance of
stopping the police interference in politics. The police officers and the human
rightists' views coincided in considering the political burden on the police as an
impediment to invest its capacities in the real police work. As one officer stated
referring to the deadly Sinai bombings in January 2015:
We were so occupied with following every detail in the life of the political
opponents, to the extent of not being aware that a complete brigade will be targeted
by several bombings in Sinai (Personal Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Additionally, two other officers referred to June 30, 2013 as an ideal moment
when the police forces were actually protecting the protestors rather than attacking
them. As one of them clarified:
I believe the police should be involved when there is a protest or a rally, but to
protect it, to make sure it will not turn into violence, to make sure it does not block
the traffic not to forcibly disperse it… We should have like a special agency to
analyze the reasons of each protest and try to address these reasons with peaceful
methods rather than violent dispersal that causes death (Telephone Interview with an
officer, February 2015)

B. Demilitarization
Demilitarizing the police was a controversial point when discussing the needed
reform in Egypt. Some of the interviewees put it as a high priority if we aim at
changing the police philosophy and make it more responsive to the people's needs,
while other considered it a difficult step given the current war on terror. As a political
science scholar explained:
The militarization cannot be easily decreased in the context of the war on terror, but
they can use more accurate weapons and work on their training to be more specific,
in order to decrease the side effects of this pattern of a militarized police. For antiriots forces, they should use water only, and specify the most dangerous cases when
they should use tear gas with certain restrictions (Personal Interview with a political
scientist, March 2015)

Thereby a human rights' researcher admitted this fact by stating:
The militarization is not likely to be lightened in the short term because it is
entrenched in the Egyptian context on different levels, and the police are not an
exception (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)

However, a police officer insisted on the needed de-militarization especially in the
context of the war on terror not only in terms of weapons and tools but also in terms
of the philosophy behind the police work. He clarified:
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We need to deal with the police from a civilian point of view; we need to declassify
its historical documents and to make them accessible to researchers in order to
analyze the reasons of the new terrorist wave (. . .) The learnt lesson from the
terrorist wave in the eighties and nineties was that we could not solve the problem
solely by force, we needed to launch intellectual revisions amongst the radicals'
leadership in prisons (. . .) now we need to understand that the militarized police is
not the solution, on the contrary we are losing more people every day (Personal
Interview with an officer, February 2015)

One angle of a demilitarized police should be a clear break with the military
tradition within the police, especially the police academy, and to transform the police
to be more of a civil service rather than a police force. Nevertheless, the Police forces
would still be an important actor in specific areas when breaking in and forcible
arrests are needed. Yet, clear rules need to be put to differentiate the military and the
police. As one officer explained:
The police should be more civilian, it must have a clear break with the military
traditions, it should be a civilian apparatus to better serve the people and get closer to
them. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

One approach to civilianize the police is to change the education pattern within
the police academy. As a researcher in security studies clarified:
For me some points of the militarization should be changed, for instance the ranks
within the police should be civilian, because you are training an officer to serve a
civilian community, not to serve as a killing machine in the army. The police students
could be living in dorms in the police academy but without being isolated from the
society. The focal point is to break this isolation around the police academy. They
might be recruited starting from age 17 to teach them the fighting arts, policing and
law courses, but they should not be isolated in a way that would be negatively
reflected on their interaction later with the people. (Personal Interview with a
researcher in security studies, March 2015)

Another angle of the demilitarization is the abolition of the military conscripts'
inclusion in the MOI under the Central Security Forces- CSF's authority. The CSF
need to be restructured to recruit professional officers and soldiers, rather than
receiving military conscripts from the Ministry of Defense. As one former officer
explained:
The MOI can recruit from ordinary people to build an anti-riot force, the recruitment
criteria might include essential education only or a degree in sports or fitness and
then train them to be better and educate them about how to deal with protests and
riots … But this process should be an intentional recruitment not as military duty. A
one hundred well trained and well equipped professional officers would eventually
succeed to disperse protest without any fatal injury, rather than 4 thousands who
know nothing… it is not an innovation, it is adopted everywhere in the world, the
professional anti-riot forces will be better because they are trained daily on anti-riots
techniques. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015)
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Another officer has strongly emphasized the same logic:
I would prefer to have like 50 thousands well trained officers in an anti-riot agency
than having a 200 thousands poorly trained soldiers serving their military duty.
(Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

Despite the importance of this step, it could not be easily applied in the short term,
as one officer clarified:
It is extremely necessary and extremely difficult in the same time. It could take 10
years to be successfully implemented. Because you have to carefully plan for it, in
terms of costs and training to prepare physically and intellectually qualified and
professional cadres. Now the CSF solider may cost 100 LE per month, the officer
who should replace him could cost 1200 LE at least per month if not more, So it is
almost times 10 in terms of financial costs without mentioning the training and the
education. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

However, another officer seemed skeptical about this step, requesting not only to
maintain the military conscripts' inclusion in the MOI, but also to higher their level to
be similar to those included in the Armed Forces.
We need soldiers of a better quality, instead of a bad soldier serving for three years; I
would prefer a good soldier who received high education to serve for only one year.
We need the soldiers of the military, who are university graduates, they are extremely
competent and they deal decently with the people. If this kind was allocated to serve
in the police, it will definitely change the level of service because they understand,
they actually use their minds, this way the State's budget will not be burdened with
extra costs, the military will just direct some of the good quality soldiers to the
police. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Nevertheless, this suggestion was widely refuted by almost all of the other
interviewees. Some of them refused to drain the good quality soldiers from the armed
forces to the police, while the others refused to emphasize the nature of the militarized
police by including the good quality of military conscripts into the MOI. As a former
officer argued:
We should rather think to recruit university graduates in the police as full officers not
as military conscripts, because frankly what is the difference between a commerce
school graduate or a law school graduate and the police academy graduate? They
should all be on the same level and recruited for the same degree which is officers
not anything lower than that. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February
2015)

C. Professionalism
The MOI is in deep need of a multiplicity of reforms on the professional level,
especially in terms of the doctrinal, managerial and technical dimensions. It was
almost consensual amongst the interviewees that the MOI should not only halt its
interference in political issues, but it should also shift its structures to permanently
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disregard the non security tasks that are burdening its agenda. As one political
scientist emphasized:
We need to lift the political burden off the MOI, so it can focus only on the security
tasks. Thus all the security representatives who are spread in the Egyptian
bureaucracy should be withdrawn and replaced by political civilian officials
(Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)

Accordingly, an officer suggested that this withdrawal should be more
institutionalized by splitting the MOI into two ministries with completely separate
bureaucracies and leaderships. He elaborated as follows:
We should have two ministries instead of the MOI, one for managing the internal
affairs and the other for only managing the security and the police work. So the
Internal Affairs Ministry would manage all the civilian files related to serving the
people such as civilian records, passports authorities and voters' records and so on,
then the police work should be separate, and run by the Security and Safety Ministry.
For, centralizing lots of tasks in the hands of the MOI permits it to control many files
for despotic purposes, and as a result the police officers are burdened with lots of
paper works that could be done by any civilian employee. (Personal Interview with a
police officer, February 2015)

Within the same structural scope, some interviewees agreed to transfer the
National Security Agency- NSA (previously known as State Security InvestigationsSSI) to the intelligence agencies to be directly affiliated to the president rather than
the MOI. The main argument for those interviewees was to avoid any potential
deviation of the MOI to renew its involvement in the political affairs. Moreover, the
aim was to stop the influence exercised by the NSA on the whole work of police for
State security reasons and allow the room for the police to rather focus on the human
security and the public safety. As one political scientist clarified:
There is no country in the world without a department for state security or an internal
intelligence. In all consolidated democracies, there is an agency playing this role. We
should not be against the existence of this agency; we should be against its bad
performance, its deviated doctrine and its impunity. It should work on the internal
affairs and report about that to the decisions makers in full respect of the law and the
democratic standards. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)

A former officer added to that:
I think this will be good for the NSA itself, but what is really important is to clearly
define the relation between the agency and the other state institutions to guarantee a
better performance and to monitor any potential deviation. (Telephone Interview with
a former officer, February 2015)

Accordingly, another former officer emphasized:
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The whole process in forming this new agency should be completely managed
outside of the MOI, yet a coordination comity is highly needed to link the NSA with
the MOI and other security and intelligence agencies in full harmony. (Telephone
Interview with a former officer, March 2015)

On the other side, a substantial part of the interviewees refused this
suggestion, since it could add to the NSA's power and leverage on the political
scene without really adding anything to its accountability. As one human
rights activist explained:
This fact could add to the NSA's power and shed a new blackout on its activity, like
the one already shed on the intelligence agencies; this could result in more difficulty
when dealing with its accountability (Telephone Interview with a human rights
activist, February 2015)

However, an officer clarified the bottom line in this matter by stating:
It should be controlled, whether it was a part of the MOI or elsewhere, but the
affiliation does not really matter, what matters are its authorities and precise tasks
assigned to it. For instance it could be transferred to work under the label of the
intelligence, but if it works the same way, we will have no difference. If it is insisting
on giving instructions in everything, in appointing the professor of university and the
imam of the mosque, we got nothing new. The people do not really care if it is a part
of the MOI or any other institution, the most important is what it is really doing. If
you are saying so to weaken the MOI or to loosen its authority, let me tell you this
was already done when the MOI collapsed in 2011, so no need to think this way.
(Telephone Interview with a police officer, February 2015)

On the managerial level, the MOI needs clearly articulated rules to run its
diverse departments. As an officer highlighted:
The MOI needs essential, clear and stable rules that cannot be broken and should be
applied on all no matter who they are. Then you will find the whole MOI functioning
perfectly and there will be no wrongdoing, because honestly, the corruption, the
nepotism and the intellectual stagnation are all as dangerous as the brutality on the
police legitimacy. (Telephone Interview with a police officer, March 2015)

Considering the same angle, other managerial reforms should be introduced, as one
political scientist clarified:
The promotion criteria should be linked to their performance rates not only to their
seniority. The circulation policy between different specializations and regions needs
to be revised. I do not understand why insisting on the circulation on the expense of
the accumulation of knowledge in a specific field? A professional police should be
specialized and accumulating knowledge. (Personal Interview with a political
scientist, March 2015)

The second dimension of the professionalism is the doctrinal reform. The
police in Egypt should reform its doctrine, first to better respect the law and the
human rights, and secondly, to embrace new work styles and to rely on soft skills and
quality as much as on hard skills and quantity. Within the first scope, the theoretical
education of human rights courses whether in the under graduation curricula or the
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post graduation training should be altered. A more practical approach should guide
this education process, as a political scientist suggested:
In order to teach them human rights properly you need some materials applied to
their own work, inspired by the situations they face daily, to be able to
psychologically convince them and to gain their support to the spirit of the human
rights. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

Then within the second scope, a large diversification of the police academy
curricula is needed. As one political science scholar highlighted:
The police academy needs change, in terms of courses, instructors and techniques of
education. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

Adding to that, an officer described what they need to learn in the academy as
follows:
They should make good use of the time we spend in the academy to teach us the
skills that we really need, rather that teaching us other courses that are not useful in
our daily work. For example, the negotiations skills and the interrogations
techniques are almost absent in the academy curricula, we only pass through them
very quickly as theoretical points in police courses. We need also to be trained on
new technology to better solve cases. (Telephone interview with a police officer,
March 2015)

Another officer pointed to the long duration of schooling in the academy and
suggested to shorten it by accepting university graduates in the police academy, rather
than high school graduates:
The police academy should accept the law school graduates to teach them the
policing courses and the physical fitness courses, there is no need for full four years
of education. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

A former officer suggested a new mechanism for recruiting candidates to join the
police academy in order to make sure that the selected candidates are perfectly fitting
the job:
The recruitment comity in the police academy should be composed of experts from
different academic backgrounds such as policing, law, psychology and sociology to
accurately choose those who really fit for the police job in terms of physical
capacities and personality traits. The enrollment of the officers' sons in the academy
is almost becoming a rule, which deprives the academy from other candidates who
could be perfect for the job. Hence, we should freeze the enrollment of the officers'
son for around five years in order to set a new rule in accepting the perfect candidates
based on their capacities not on their family connections. (Telephone interview with
a former officer, March 2015)

97

Another officer emphasized the need to change the recruiting criteria to enroll a
better quality of candidates that would possibly well receive the new curricula of the
academy:
We can ensure a better performance if we applied new mechanisms of recruitment to
enroll officers with good morals, then train them in a professional way and feed their
souls with good values to make them driven by noble philosophy. It is not the
responsibility of the police that the people have no conscience in some cases, it is a
disease in the whole community, but it is the responsibility of the academy to teach
them good manners and noble values to minimize their tendency for deviation. We
might not be able to test them in terms of values and convictions like we test them
physically and medically but we can teach them all these values within the academy.
(Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

This need for ethical and moral orientation in the academy has been also
emphasized by a former officer when he contrasted what he was taught in the
academy with what was taught to his late father, who was also an officer.
He used to teach me what he learnt in the academy in the sixties, he used to tell me
do not ever try to forge a case, do not ever beat a suspect to force him to confess, the
good officer is the one who solves the case with his own intelligence, the torture is
the tool of incompetent officers, use your mind not your hand or weapons, these were
the ethics of the old generation of officers, but what we learnt in the academy was
completely the opposite, these ethics should be taught in the academy instead of the
arrogant discourse that they teach nowadays. (Telephone Interview with a former
officer, February 2015)

Besides, a strong reliance on new methods and work techniques should be put
forward in any potential plan of reform. Yet, there was a divergence around if these
new methods would necessitate new resources or only new allocation of the already
existing resources. One officer highlighted the importance of increasing the MOI's
share of the state budget to deliver a better security service:
Just give us more money and you will get a better security service, with more money
we can buy a new technology to enhance the communication system between the
police stations and the 122 emergency call center, a new technology to enhance the
internal communication system of wireless voice network and to make it covering the
whole country, a new technology to better protect the police vehicles, a new
technology to equip the patrol forces with laptops or tablets directly connected to
every directorate in order to check on the suspects' criminal records without arresting
them and transferring them to the police station. (Telephone Interview with an
officer, February 2015)

However, a former officer considered that the MOI is not serious about applying
new technology arguing that the problem is not lacking funds, it is rather lacking the
will to change the old methods. He elaborated:
If the MOI has 1 billion pounds to purchase equipments, it would rather spend it on
weapons, masks, uniforms, bulletproof vests and shoes. It would totally ignore that it
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could purchase with the same amount of money surveillance cameras, computers,
monitors, simulators, soft skills training such as psychological analysis and so on.
The problem is in the mindset which tends to increase weapons on the expense of
other needed soft technology, hence reflecting the state inclination towards coercion
rather than negotiations and dialogue. It simply prefers to use the muscles over the
mind. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

This mindset problem was described by an officer by stating:
They have to understand that new equipments do not equal new weapons. (Personal
Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer added to this regard:
What we need the most is to apply a scientific method in criminal investigation and
to generously invest in equipment and training to reach this goal. (Telephone
Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Similarly, a journalist briefed this issue by stating:
They cannot even imagine that the machines can do better in some cases than
exhausted personnel. But again if we think about the exhausted personnel, we can
receive extraordinary results with little change on the organizational and managerial
level, when we just improve their conditions and think about them as human.
(Personal Interview with a journalist specialized in human rights and security issues,
March 2015)

Accordingly a political scientist emphasized on the same matter with more
elaboration:
The problem is solved when they understand that the cameras are as important as the
weapons… Then downsizing would be applicable in Egypt but first we have to
enhance the quality of the forces so we can let some of them go, to increase the
quality in order to decrease the quantity, to replace some personnel with cameras,
computers, equipment, and data analysis applications. (Personal interview with a
political scientist, March 2015)

The issue of downsizing is extremely important when aiming at transforming the
police into a more effective force. But the downsizing could be quite controversial if
we consider the constant complaint of the officers from the big work load and the
extended working hours. As one officer describe this problem:
When I get my fair amount of working hours and I leave to home, there is no officer
to replace me; we definitely need to increase the numbers of the officers. In
Alexandria for instance, the total police service consists of 1100-1200 officers in all
departments, we need to at least double this number. (Telephone Interview with an
officer, February 2015)

Thereby, a security studies' researcher tried to solve this downsizing dilemma by
highlighting the following:
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Anyone with basic knowledge in police reform that might come to advice the MOI
will right away advice them on increasing the numbers of officers and decreasing the
numbers of sub-officers. (Personal Interview with a researcher in security studies,
March 2015)

In this matter, the vetting process could be particularly important to guide the
downsizing and the selective recruitment processes. As one human rights' researcher
explained it:
The vetting is a tool for gradual change and democratization, not a mere purge. It is
a long objective and not personalized process, where the rights of the personnel are
preserved, it involves an administrative mechanism for selection not a criminal
prosecution, according to which we can decide who should continue in his job, who
should be promoted or removed, and even those who are removed would be
compensated and have a retirement package. The vetting process is really
complicated but to manage it successfully, we need to access the database of the
MOI and its personnel's records, in order to accurately make the right decision.
(Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)

Moreover, the downsizing is crucial if we considered that most of the MOI's budget
is directed to salaries payment, thus, a substantial decrease in the personnel would
positively impact the possibility of purchasing new equipment and including new
technology. Yet this matter would not be possible if we do not put forward an effective
auditing system to control the financial department within the MOI.
What I need as a reform is to honestly and adequately manage the finances of the
MOI and to direct the surplus in this regard to purchase new technical assistance
tools such as forensic medicine tools and criminal analysis laboratories. Then after
that we should think about improving the officers' salaries and working conditions. I
can wait longer for a raise in my salary but I cannot tolerate that the money is
wasted on huge payments for the high ranking colonels, rather than purchasing
useful tools to enhance our work. (Email interview with an officer, February 2015)

A similar stance was presented by another officer as follows:
I think that number one priority for resources allocation in the MOI today should be
for the bomb disposal officers who might risk their lives to save ours, they need to get
the best equipment and training in this regard, no matter how match it would cost.
(Personal interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer pointed to the financial management of the MOI's resources from
a different angle by stating:
Step number one in countering corruption and bribery on all ranking levels is to pay
suitable salaries, I do not care how much would that be, but I need to be sure that it
is a just reward for my work and that there is a general policy of equity in this
regard, that means that everyone in my rank and doing the same job are equally
rewarded, and that the high ranking colonels are not receiving exaggerated salaries.
(Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

A firm counter corruption policy is very much needed to rationalize the public
spending, to decrease the salaries' disparities and to improve the officers' motivation
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to better fulfill their jobs. One angle to approach this policy is to modernize the
police tools, as a political scientist stated:
Countering corruption is a substantial part of the police reform, the more you
modernize the police tools the more difficult the corruption will be, because every
wrongdoing and misconduct could easily be tracked and then punished. (Personal
interview with a political science scholar, March 2015)

A second angle to approach a counter corruption policy is to set a firm
transparency policy introduced through a clear law, as a former officer described it:
We need a special law to protect the officers who want to report on the corruption
and the nepotism of their superiors, because there are plenty of them but they are
afraid of potential punishment if they exposed the corruption. (Telephone interview
with a former officer, March 2015)

Moreover, an important complementary measure to promote transparency and
counter corruption is the protection of the whistle blowers within the police apparatus.
Therefore, it is important to allow the formation of the police unions in order to serve
as a legal medium to bridge the gap with people and a platform for the officers to
channel their views. As one political scientist put it:
We need it as a feedback mechanism, for both sides, for the citizens to evaluate their
interaction with the police, and for the officers who need to channel their complaints
without fearing to be punished by their superiors for revealing the work deficiencies.
(Personal interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

Another important input to help designing an effective security policy was put
forward by a sociologist, as follows:
We need to initiate a new apparatus within the MOI to be dedicated to the futuristic
studies, to do research about the prospects of crimes and the new solutions that might
serve the police work, this would recruit some researchers like anthropologists and
officers with field experience to design plans and strategies for police work, this type
of studies would be important to inform the security policy from a sold scientific
background so it would be a knowledge based policy… or at least the MOI should
engage in partnerships with the NGOs and the Universities in order to produce this
type of studies. (Personal interview with a sociologist, March 2015)

The problem as articulated by an officer is not the lack of scientific knowledge
within the MOI; rather it is the lack of political will to put this knowledge into action
and to design effective policies
There is a plenty of studies produced in police training courses and master's and PhD
degrees suggesting many patterns of reforming the MOI. The solution is in the
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scientific approach, all what we need is a serious will to implement all these
accumulated studies. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer has gone further to request wider cooperation with international
partners to learn about other experiences in improving the police performance
whether on the soft training or on the high technology and equipment levels (Personal
interview with an officer, February 2015). Yet, again all these measures need a strong
political will to be accurately implemented.
D. Accountability
Almost the entire sample agreed to introduce several levels and mechanisms of
oversight on the police work. The police officers agreed to be subject to external
oversight mechanisms with one condition, which is preserving their rights and
providing them with adequate working techniques and tools. On the other hand, the
human rights experts and researchers emphasized the role of the internal control
authority within the MOI as an important mechanism to correct the potential
deviation of the police. Then the external mechanisms of oversight would come as a
second option to complement the internal control and suggest better policies to
enhance the police performance. As one political scientist put it:
If the internal control authority is serious about making the police more accountable,
they should plan for that rather than just hiring a high ranking colonel to justify the
police abuses or deny their occurrence. For instance, the internal control should
announce that the police abuse cases were around 90 in 2014, but new mechanisms
would be introduced to reduce this number to only 45 the next year, then 20 the
following year and so on. These mechanisms could be like new training, new
performance evaluation templates, and new incentives for police chefs to report about
their wrongdoing subordinates. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February
2015)

An officer agreed to consolidate the work of the internal control and added to that:
We need to dismantle the nepotism network that might protect the misconduct and
also to protect and reward the honest officers who refuse to execute the deviated
commands of their superiors and insist on exposing their wrongdoing. (Telephone
interview with an officer, February 2015)

A human rights' activist emphasized the need to constantly assess the police
performance whether on the criminal or on the conduct levels
The officers' performance should be constantly rated to reward the ethical and
effective officers, and punish the abusers and lazy officers; such a mechanism should
enhance the general police performance and minimize the potential wrongdoing.
(Personal interview with a human rights activist, March 2015)
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A strong judicial oversight on the police work would definitely promote the police
reform. Yet, it must go hand in hand with a general reform in the justice system that
should include the judiciary, the prosecutors and the ministry of justice (Personal
interview with a political scientist, March 2015). A police officer has precisely
emphasized this matter by stating:
I can only trust the judges and the prosecutors in overseeing my work if they are
truly abided by the law and do not seek to only hold me accountable for the sake of
the superiority of their own profession over mine, the law should simply rule over
us all. (Personal interview with a police officer, February 2015)

The judicial oversight might promote police accountability through civil litigation
if the police would be obliged to financially compensate every victim that was
abused at the hands of the police (Telephone interview with an officer, February
2015). Moreover, the prosecutors should activate their original prerogatives in
checking on the detention cells, making sure that every detainee is legally registered
in the police station records and that the detainees are receiving adequate health care
and are not subjected to torture or any type of abuse. Adding to that, a special
judicial comity should be initiated to review all the violence incidents where firearms
were used by the police to evaluate if the firearms' use was indispensable and the
police were really at risk (Personal interview with a human rights activist, March
2015). This step would request some legal revisions to accurately specify the
situations where police can use firearms and where they should use other non lethal
tools instead (Personal interview with a security studies' researcher, March 2015).
Moreover, a human rights expert suggested the need for initiating a new post of an
investigative judge to precede the work of the public prosecutor. Thus, the authority
to investigate a case, assigned to the investigative judge, would be separated from the
authority to file an accusation, assigned to the public prosecutor. Such a
diversification would eventually assure more equity to the justice system and narrow
the police authority in manipulating and avoiding the prosecutor oversight over their
work (Personal interview with a human rights' expert, March 2015)
A former officer suggested granting the authority of visiting the detention cells to
the human rights NGOs' representatives to check on the police respect of human
conditions for the detainees.
The police officers would be better protected from false claims of violations and
abuses if each police station was under tight observation, conducted by human rights
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NGOs or some notable figures in the local community to check on the respect of the
detainees' rights. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Accordingly a human rights expert emphasized this mechanism as one of the
important tools of parliamentarian oversight in this regard.
A special comity within the parliament should have the authority to conduct
unpredicted visits to detention places. (Personal interview with a human rights
expert, March 2015)

Nevertheless, a political scientist disagreed with this view, requesting the public
prosecutors to preserve this authority and the parliamentarians to exercise another type
of oversight.
The political accountability should not be exercised by a parliamentarian comity
which conducts visits to different prisons; those parliamentarians could easily be
deceived and would probably not understand the tricks of the police in hiding the
abuses. And also in young democracies where the authority is not well
institutionalized, that could open the door for nepotism, clientelism and exchanged
interests. So the parliament should practice a political oversight not a
technical/professional one. That is why the internal control is important because
they actually understand the details and technicalities of the police work. The
political oversight should be practiced on the minister of Interior, to discuss a
reform plan, to legislate a new law not to visit the prisons or the police stations.
(Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)

Adding to that, several officers have emphasized the role of the parliamentarian
oversight as a tool to investigate any complaint by a police officer who faced injustice
by the internal inspection and control authority within the MOI. As one officer put it:
I need a parliamentarian oversight to protect me if the internal control authority was
tough on me; I mean we need an external oversight to watch the internal overseers of
the police work. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

However another officer was suspicious about the competence of the parliament in
overseeing the police work arguing that the parliamentarians might lack the needed
technical expertise to do this job. Thus an oversight conducted by the judiciary or the
executive body would be more welcomed by the police (Email Interview with a police
officer, February 2015)
Here comes the importance of initiating a new body with both judicial and
executive authorities to oversee the police work. The ombudsman was initiated in
many countries as a mixed authority capable of overseeing the police. Its task
consisted of transferring the criminal wrongdoing to courts, advising the police
leadership on the needed reforms and recommending new legislative amendments to
the parliament. Such a body if initiated in Egypt, would get some of the public
prosecutors' authority in investigating cases with special focus on human rights abuses
and misconduct done by the police. However, it would definitely be an added value in
promoting the human rights culture and the legal knowledge amongst Egyptians. Some
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of the interviewees refuted the need for initiating a new body arguing that the work of
the prosecutors would be sufficient if properly activated. Nevertheless, the other part
has welcomed the initiation of the ombudsman institution since all the people needed
to enhance their human rights culture, whether they were regular citizens or police
officers.
A human rights researcher emphasized the context of initiating this new body as
follows:
If there is a serious political will, an ombudsman should be put in place with wide
prerogatives to oversee the police work. Yet, if the political will is absent, all
attempts to form new oversight bodies would be superficial and merely a new façade
for old deviated practices. (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March
2015)

Adding to that, a former officer stressed on the founding criteria for creating this
new body:
The inspectors of this body should be carefully chosen from the police and
the prosecutors' body, to ensure that the nepotism culture is not entrenched
in their mindset; otherwise the whole experience would fail. (Telephone
interview with a former officer, February 2015)

An officer has also emphasized the role of the media and the civil society in
promoting a good legal knowledge and human rights culture in society. He had also
requested the civil society to address the police officers with these legal knowledge
promotion campaigns because a big portion of officers might have deficiencies as well
in this regard (Personal interview with an officer, February 2015). In addition, a
human rights' researcher suggested a wide campaign of oversight conducted by the
civil society especially through the new media to map the police abuses in order to
hold them accountable later on. He elaborated on that matter as follows:
The oversight mechanisms applied through the anonymity of the social media is
extremely crucial when the political regime is closed and unfriendly with
accountability mechanisms. The civil society has been consecutively targeted for
trying to expose the police abuses. However, doing the same mission via social media
and cyber space at large could lower the costs of challenging the MOI's extended
powers. We should conduct a mapping of all police stations where abuses and torture
are taking place in order to spread the knowledge and keep track of the human rights
violators within the police body. We would need this map later to prosecute the
abusers if we witnessed a political opening or to protect the honest officers if we
witnessed a moment of total collapse and violence against the police. (Personal
Interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)
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VIII- Conclusion
This study aimed at exploring the management of the police reform in the
changing political environment in Egypt between 2011 and 2015. It also aimed at
assessing the degree to which democratic policing norms such as political neutrality,
professionalism, de-militarization, and accountability were applied. It then suggested
some strategies of reforms that could be applied in the Egyptian context to promote
democratic policing. Relying on a sample of only 22 in-depth interviews this study
has substantial limitations. Thus, its results cannot be subjected to any generalization.
They could merely serve as a preliminary assessment of the police officers and
human rights advocates' insights about police reform, taking into consideration the
limitation of the sample.
One of the main findings of this research was that the police reform is tightly linked
to the political environment, especially in the moments of political change. In other
words, the police reform defined by its four main democratic policing norms is usually
promoted when the regime in a changing political environment tends to democratize.
Moreover, police reform is usually one part of several reform cycles that a specifi c
political regime undergoes when transforming from an authoritarian to a democratic
regime. Such a remark was quite obvious when exploring the experiences of police
reform in Brazil, Turkey, Poland and South Africa. In Brazil, the police was reformed
on gradual basis following strong security crises that obliged the political leaders to
decide to reform and the security actors to design and implement this reform. But in
Turkey, the police tended to reform as a respond to political pressure put on Turkey to
be more abided by democratic standards to prepare for the European Union accession.
In the case of Poland, the police reform was a substantial part of a wider trend of
political transformation that took place in the country based on a negotiated transition
with the communist regime. Thus, the door was open to many cycles of alternation to
power that have impacted the legislations regulating the police work. Similarly in
South Africa, the negotiated plan of police reform was part of a general political
transformation following the conclusion of the apartheid. In all cases of changing
political environment whether it was gradual on the long term or comprehensive on
the short-term, the progress of the police reform was positively related to the general
progress in the democratic change. Thus, the police reform was triggered by major
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security crises that yielded popular protests then a general opening in the political
regime. Therefore, the design of the reform process was the joint effort of a diversity
of actors such as political actors, human rights advocates, professional unions and
bureaucratic cadres. Moreover, in the cases where certain external actors were
involved, such as in Poland for instance, the reform was quite successful and integral.
However, assessing the success of the police reform is always relative considering
the general political context. Thus, according to the four democratic policing norms,
some of the four cases might not be a flagrant model of reform success. For instance,
Turkey has deficiencies when it comes to the demilitarization. So is Brazil when it
comes to the political neutrality and also South Africa when it comes to accountability.
Therefore, the police reform is quite relative and does not consist of a universal
formula that could apply easily in any place in the world. It is rather a tailored plan
that should involve a variety of stakeholders but should be first endorsed by a firm
political will.
Therefore, when tackling the Egyptian case, this study focused on assessing the
extent of the introduced reforms under each of the four defining norms of democratic
policing. Certainly, some angles of reform such as demilitarization and political
neutrality failed to meet the theoretical standards in this regards. However, the
professionalism and the accountability marked some positive reforms that should serve
as solid basis for any future reform in Egypt. Yet, they are not sufficient to judge the
Egyptian case of police reform as successful. Thereby, also in Egypt, the political
environment matters since the reform is a political choice that requires a substantial
consensus and a political will. After four years of the Egyptian Revolution, several
opportunities for building such a consensus were not properly materialized. This fact
has deeply impacted the extent of the introduced reform and has reduced it to
incremental positive steps especially in the professionalism and the accountability
angles. However, these steps could not stand as a real reform since they failed to
change the nature of the police.
Indeed, the research tried to explore the possibility of passing some professional
reforms in the police without necessarily introducing similar steps in the
accountability, the political neutrality and the demilitarization dimensions. However,
the applicability of this attempt was refuted by almost all of the interviewees, based on
the assumption that a holistic reform would be more effective. Yet, we missed the
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opportunity of applying a comprehensive reform following the 2011 revolution as it
was the case in Poland. Considering the Brazilian case, Egypt still has the chance to
invest in police reform if emerged a serious series of security crises. In this regard,
Brazil stands as a model where strong oversight measures applied by the civil society
targeting accountability programs turned to be integrated programs of partnership with
the police departments to boost their professionalism. This idea of building partnership
between the police and the civil society was frequently tackled by most of the
interviewees whether under the professionalism or the accountability angles. Yet, the
police culture stands an impediment to properly invest in this partnership approach.
Despite, the wide common ground between the insights of police officers and human
rights advocates regarding the reform, mutual trust needed to invest in partnership is
still missing. Most of the police officers who agreed to conduct the interviews were at
first suspicious about the outsider who wants to investigate about their job conditions.
However, at the end of each interview a certain level of trust was built between us.
Thus, their perception about this type of studies turned gradually to be positive.
Taking into consideration the limitation of the sample, this study tries to present an
Egyptian formula for police reform based on the common ground between the views
of police officers and human rights advocates. First, police reform is not an isolated
aspect of the wider picture of a democratic political environment. Thus, an effective
police reform is almost impossible without a wider circle of reform targeting the state
bureaucracy, the justice system and the parliamentarian authority.

Hence, the

interdependency between the police work and the justice system requires a parallel
reform process conducted in all of the institutions in question. Moreover, such
interdependency is quite applicable to the relationship between the four norms of
democratic policing. Boosting the police professionalism without pushing for more
accountability mechanisms would not result in an effective reform. Yet, the most
important is that the political neutrality is the solid key that could decide on the
prospects of the reform process altogether. Similar to that is the demilitarization,
because it reflects the general balance of power and the civil military relations in a
certain country. Therefore, unless there are substantial improvements in political
neutrality and demilitarization, police reform could not be materialized. It is also
important to highlight that some aspects of the demilitarization should be addressed on
the long term. Therefore, some aspects of the police reform could be postponed or
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scheduled on the long term. Yet, the political will for planning and implementing the
reform agenda on a holistic and a comprehensive basis should be clearly stated before
starting the reform.
On the other hand, the professionalism angle is quite important, especially on the
doctrinal level, where a diversification of the police education inputs should be
introduced. Additionally, a more rational allocation of the police resources should
guide the spending towards purchasing new working tools and soft applications as
much as purchasing new weapons and hard equipments. Concerning the accountability
angle, it should be tackled as a comprehensive map of mechanisms that complement
each other. Thus, an effective accountability does not consist of separated obsolete
bodies. Rather, it consists of an integrated map of checks and balances, in which each
institution is fully abided by the law. And in this regard, ending the dominance of the
executive over the judiciary and the legislative bodies, is crucial, as well as, promoting
the freedom of expression for media outlets. This fact obviously recalls the
intertwining of an effective police reform and a general democratic political
environment. Yet, until a clear political will is introduced, the civil society still has a
bunch of scattered opportunities to build a wider popular demand for police reform.
Promoting human rights culture through media outlets and civil society organizations
is one option to building this demand. Constant exposing of police brutalities and
security failures is another option. And approaching police officers themselves with an
appealing discourse of human rights promotion is a third option, in order to widen the
cycle of reformists within the police apparatus.
Resting on all of the above, extensive studies on democratic policing should be
conducted in order to investigate further aspects of reform. And in this regard, the
organizational culture change within the police should be prioritized, along with legal
and administrative channels for promoting police accountability.
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